Organizational Gestalten and ValkyrieExcerpts from: “Organizational Gestalt, personnel management and performance: Towards conceptual clarification and empirical extension”By Max Visser
Army organizations relatively seldom have been studied by students of organization and personnel management, probably due to unfamiliarity with (or even repugnance to) military affairs, the dangers in acquiring data, and a shared image of armies as simple, routine-ridden “machines” (Morgan, 1997; Moskos, 1984; Mutch, 2006). This lack of attention, however, does not seem fully justifiable. Armies constitute the world’s oldest large-scale organizations, representing centuries of experience in surviving arguably the most competitive, turbulent and dynamic situation an organization may encounter, i.e., actual war. Moreover, the image of armies as hierarchical and bureaucratic “machines” seems at odds with the degree of flexibility and adaptation current organization theory requires of organizations in turbulent and dynamic situations (March and Weissinger-Baylon, 1986; Wilson, 1989). In other words, army organizations seem to pose an apparent paradox here.
In solving this apparent paradox, the German Army before and in World War II appears as a particularly interesting case from the military and historical literature. This seems surprising, since this army is often associated with a rigid hierarchy (“Befehl ist Befehl”) and strict discipline (“Kadavergehorsam”), which characteristics do not seem conducive to a flexible adaptation to the contingencies of war. Yet, despite this association and in spite of having lost Word War II, military historians generally agree that the German Army was one of the most effective of all armies in that war (e.g., Dupuy, 1984; Hart, 2001; Murray, 1992; Van Creveld, 1983).
In this paper my purpose is to show, first, that the German Army’s organization and personnel management were to a comparatively high degree configured towards fighting power and, second, that this high degree of “Gestaltung” may be positively related to a comparatively strong battlefield performance. Fighting power of an army is defined here as “the sum total of qualities that make armies fight, resting on mental, intellectual, and organizational foundations, and manifest in discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness” (Van Creveld, 1983: 3). Here I abstain from analyzing the quality and quantity of equipment, which, together with fighting power, determines military strength (e.g., Showalter, 2002). Battlefield performance is defined by two measures, combat effectiveness and score effectiveness, discussed below (Dupuy, 1984, 1986).
This paper will proceed as follows. In the second section I will present a theory of organizational part-whole relationships, intended to link various concepts of Gestalt, configuration, system, consistency and simplicity. In the third section I will present an analysis of German army organization, personnel management policies, and fighting power during World War II on the basis of historical and military sources, together with a brief comparison with two Allied armies. The fourth section contains a quantitative analysis of relative battlefield performance, while the paper ends with discussion and conclusions.
The organizational GestaltThe study of part-whole relationships has been a central theme in a broad scientific and philosophical movement known as Gestalt theory. Initiated by the treatise of Von Ehrenfels on “Gestaltqualitäten” (1890), Gestalt theory made important inroads in early twentieth century Continental philosophy (Ash, 1995; Smith, 1988). In 1912 Wertheimer introduced Gestalt theory in the field of experimental psychology, from which the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology emerged (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1947; Wertheimer 1938). This school inspired further extensions of Gestalt theory to interpersonal relations and group processes, leading to the formulation of field theory (Lewin, 1951), attribution and balance theories (Heider, 1958) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Other applications of Gestalt theory reached the fields of neurology (Goldstein 1939), psychotherapy (Perls, Hefferline and Goodman, 1973) and political science (Visser, 1994ab), while parts of communication science also underwent Gestalt influences (Bateson, 1972; Visser, 2003ab, 2007ab).
The applicability to a diversity of psychological and social phenomena and the firm empirical base Gestalt theory has enjoyed over the years invite an extension to the study of organizational part-whole relationships. Here I propose a theoretical framework on the basis of a logical analysis of the Gestalt concept (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988abc; Simons, 1988; Visser, 1997, 2003b). The framework formulates three criteria for the specification of wholes, which in the remainder of this section I will apply to organizations.
The first criterion refers to the unilateral dependence of a whole on its basis (or fundament). The existence of objects that form the basis of the whole is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the whole itself, but the reverse is not true: a whole cannot exist without constituent parts or elements. In wholes conforming to this criterion there is a low degree of interdependence among constituent elements. Reciprocal determination between parts approaches or equals zero, and no energy and tensions are present between the elements. An example would be a heap of stones lying by the side of the road (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988ac; Simons, 1988).
In the organizational literature this criterion is exemplified in approaches that, for example, look at aggregations of human resource management practices (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004), at combinations of conditions (Lee et al., 2004), and at patterns or integration without specifying the dynamics thereof (Freeman, 1999; Edmondson, 1999). Wholes conforming to this first criterion I propose to label as aggregate wholes.
The second criterion refers to supersummativity, often expressed in the statement that the whole is more than (or different from) the mere sum of its parts. It is a property of a whole which cannot meaningfully be ascribed to the totality of the parts making up that whole. In wholes conforming to the first and the second criterion there is a high degree of interdependence among constituent elements. Reciprocal determination between parts is high, involving energy and tensions. An example would be a charged and isolated conductor: the whole under consideration is the field containing the charges, the parts are the field elements that reciprocally determine each other through the influence of the field’s forces (Köhler, 1947).
Characteristic of such wholes is the fact that their internal processes depend upon the topographical boundaries of the system, but at the same time take place independent of the nature of that system. These internal processes tend toward a state of stationary equilibrium, according to which the distribution of parts and forces display a tendency towards equalization or balance. In Gestalt theory this tendency appears as the law of “Prägnanz” or “good” Gestalt, according to which the organization of wholes will always be as “good” as the prevailing conditions permit. The term “good” refers to properties like regularity, symmetry, and proximity (Koffka, 1935; Wertheimer, 1938).
In the organizational literature this second criterion is exemplified in approaches that, for example, look at patterns that represent non-linear synergistic effects and higher-order interactions (Delery and Doty, 1996), at a holistic stance in which the parts of a social entity take their meaning from the whole (Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, 1993), and at systems that attain a state of consistency or harmony, due to mutual reinforcement among system elements (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Siggelkow, 2002). Wholes conforming to this second criterion I propose to label as functional wholes or systems.
The third criterion refers to the notion of transposition, which refers to all kinds of modification of wholes in which some aspect of form remains constant or invariant. In wholes conforming to the third criterion there is not only a high degree of reciprocal determination between parts, involving energy and tensions, but also an underlying theme or principle that remains constant in all transformations that whole undergoes. An example would be a melody played in different keys (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988ab; Simons, 1988).
Characteristic of such wholes is their degree of organization in accordance to a single theme or principle. Some wholes are perfectly arranged in accordance with the principle, while other wholes are just barely organized enough to recognize the principle. The law of “Pragnänz” or “good” Gestalt under this criterion takes a somewhat different form than under the second criterion. It may either formally refer to “Prägnanz” as originality (the primacy or autonomy of a phenomenon, its capacity to serve as a prototype), or materially to “Prägnanz” as meaningfulness (in accordance with the specific nature of the given structure, its types of mental set, habits and traditions in relation to a given environment) (Smith, 1988).
In the organizational literature this third criterion is exemplified in approaches that, for example, look at simplicity, the degree to which an organization’s elements are orchestrated by a single theme, principle or workplace philosophy (Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006; Miller, 1996; Mintzberg, 1978). More in general, this criterion is exemplified in chaotic or “fractal” organizations, in which the organization’s core values and mission are patterned into the behavior of its members (Morgan, 1997; Wheatley, 1992). Wholes conforming to the third criterion I propose to label as Gestalten or configurations.
Army organization and fighting powerComparatively more than the US and British Armies, the German Army’s internal organization and personnel management were configured towards fighting power. I distinguish six interrelated aspects, the first pertaining to organization and the remaining five pertaining to various aspects of personnel management.
As a first aspect, the German philosophy of war acknowledged the existence of environmental uncertainty and turbulence and emphasized the need for a decentralized approach to adapt to it. This philosophy was deeply influenced by the crushing defeat of the Prussian Army at the hands of Napoleon in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806). In reflecting on the causes of defeat, leading military philosophers and practitioners like Von Clausewitz, Von Scharnhorst and Von Moltke gradually came to the fundamental insight that friction, uncertainty and ambiguity are inherent in the “fog of war”. These characteristics should be accepted as given, rather than being contained in vain through detailed planning and upper-echelon hierarchical control (Dunivan 2003; Echevarria, 1996; Frieser, 2005).
To deal effectively with the “fog of war”, German war doctrine increasingly encouraged individual initiative, independent thinking and responsibility at all levels of command. This doctrinal approach became known as “Auftragstaktik”, a command and control system in which commanders were being given missions, rather than orders (“Befehlstaktik”). In this system “the mission must unmistakably express the will of the commander. The objective, course of action and mission constraints, such as time, must be clear and definite without restricting freedom of action more than necessary in order to make use of the initiative of individuals charged with the tasks to be accomplished. Limits as to the method of execution, within the framework of the higher commander’s will, are imposed only where essential for coordination with other commands” (Von Lossow, 1977: 87-88; Uhle-Wetter, 1993; Widder, 2002).
As a second aspect, the German Army’s internal organization concentrated on combat effectiveness, delegating supporting functions to the rear. Towards that purpose, the German Army was divided into a Field Army, responsible for all military operations, and a Replacement Army, responsible for training, replacements, procurement, and administration. Both branches were organized on the basis of regional defense districts, with the purpose of bringing men, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers together from the same region, thus promoting social homogeneity. Both branches also maintained close connections, through rotation of officers and personnel, frequent visits and close personal ties between officers (Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
As a third aspect, officers and NCOs were primarily selected on the basis of character and trained towards decisive combat leadership. The selection of officers, their admission to officer training and their commission rested with the regimental commanders of the men involved. Only in 1942 a central screening office was instituted for officer testing, but the other decisions remained at the regimental level. Officers were primarily selected on the basis of character and will power, more than intelligence or education. Psychological tests, examinations and personal evaluations played a main role in the selection process. Formal training lasted between 9-16 months, in which tactics and operations were emphasized, while strategy, logistics and organization were relatively neglected. As the war proceeded, active front service increasingly came to be regarded as the best training of aspiring officers, including those NCOs who showed leadership and initiative in front of the enemy. Promotion to higher ranks primarily occurred on the basis of personal evaluations of character, competence and the ability to generate trust under front line conditions, increasingly more than seniority or General Staff training (Dupuy, 1984; Knox, 2000; Van Creveld, 1983).
Although in the course of the war a shortage of officers developed, the German Army in general did not compromise on their quality, preferring competent junior or no officers over incompetent ones. Officers should show responsibility, independent action and quick decision-making, while remaining within the framework of the mission of their senior commanders. They should lead from up front, issuing their own mission orders on the basis of first-hand knowledge of the situation. Unlike most other armies, officers were expected to live with their men and allowed to fraternalize with them when off duty. At the same time they were expected to enforce strict discipline, thus combining attitudes of sternness and benevolence. In general both officers and senior NCOs, at least below battalion level, were highly regarded by their men (Antal, 1993; Frieser, 2005; Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
The selection of NCOs and their admission rested with the company or battery commanders of the men involved, acting on General Staff guidelines. Selection again occurred mainly on the basis of character and will power. Aspiring NCOs received two years of training in special battalions by regimental officers and senior NCOs, leading to a strong “esprit de corps” among them. The avenue to and from of NCO-ship was relatively open, with one in six men being promoted to NCO and many NCOs becoming officers, eleven of them even attaining the rank of general. Due to a shortage of men, however, NCO selection and training requirements had relaxed noticeably by the end of 1944 (Rush, 1999; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
As a fourth aspect, men were selected, trained and organized in ways that bolstered unit cohesion and morale. The selection of recruits occurred in local centers by a selection officer and a physician, while their admission to specific army branches rested with their future regimental commanders. Selection again was based on personal judgments and tests, assessing character more than intelligence. Recruits received their mainly tactical and practical basic training of about 12-21 weeks in the Replacement Army, after which they were transferred to the Field Replacement Battalions (“Feldersatzbattallione”) of their future Field Army division for advanced training (Hart, 2001; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
In the German Army replacements were mainly used to set up new divisions, not to bring existing divisions up to strength. This practice turned divisions into cohesive, tightly knit units with considerable fighting power, until cohesion gains were offset by the depletion of men and officers due to war attrition. Further, this practice made rotation of divisions in and out the line possible to the very end of World War II. Rotation involved a few weeks of refreshment, rearmament, recovery and rest, which were quite important for morale (Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
Replacements reached their divisions in 1,000 men strong, armed and self-sustained marching battalions (“Marschbattallione”), led by officers of the receiving division. Upon arrival, the men and their officers were dispersed over the three companies of a “Feldersatzbattallion”, which were closely tied to the division’s three regiments. Recovered men and officers traveled back to their last field unit in the same “Marschbattallione”, which in this way were instrumental in integrating old and new men and officers. Recovered soldiers, though small in numbers, were particularly welcomed by their units, since these veterans were important for group cohesion and front atmosphere (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
Since especially at the Eastern front war attrition often broke up cohesive units in a matter of days, other sources of morale were important as well. Although the influence of Nazi propaganda is often mentioned in this respect, it is estimated that Nazi enthusiasts made up only 10-15 percent of all enlisted men. However, they were more numerous among NCOs and young officers, and much more numerous among Waffen SS and paratroopers. Particularly appealing in Nazi propaganda was the idea of “Volksgemeinschaft”, an ideal that promised a harmonious society without class conflict in which individuals would be integrated in their communities. Further, personal faith in Hitler as a leader was widespread among the troops (Fritz, 1996; Madej, 1978; Messerschmidt, 1983; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
As the war progressed, other forces driving German morale became the increasing realization that the German Homeland was now in danger, the still faint but uneasy realization that the war excesses and crimes committed by German forces, in particularly at the Eastern front, would now backfire on Germany at the hands of the revenging Russians, and the Allied call for unconditional surrender. It led to the sardonic exhortation: “Enjoy the war while you can, because the peace will be terrible” (Kershaw, 1990: 57; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
As a fifth aspect, the General Staff of the German Army played an important role at the higher levels of command. Established in 1814, it was the Army’s most prestigious and exclusive institution, until late 1942 the only road to preferred promotion and the rank of general. General Staff training was geared towards tactics and operations and combining practical and formal training, relatively neglecting strategy and administration. Again personal character was deemed more important than intelligence, and the tough 18 month training program was intended primarily to test and bolster character. After 1942, however, the influence of staff training on career development waned as Hitler sought to decrease the influence of the General Staff and the Army’s “old guard” in favor of “Volk” officers showing combat talent and accomplishment (Dupuy, 1984; Knox, 2000; Van Creveld, 1983).
In the spirit of Napoleon, the General Staff (and its equivalents at army, corps and division levels) functioned as a small, well-trained, integrated support unit of commanders, emphasizing execution over planning and shunning detailed paperwork that, in the words of Von Moltke, “would not survive the first contact with the enemy”. Staffs were very reluctant to place administrative burdens on the troops in the field, relying on global ten days reports on strength and losses instead of detailed daily reports. Staffs at all echelons remained well-informed and closely connected to one another, though, because officers rotated continuously between the General Staff and senior field command positions (Boothe, 2005; Dupuy, 1984; Hughes, 1986; Van Creveld, 1983).
An important role of the General Staff was the rigorous and objective analysis of victory and defeat on the basis of after action reports (“Erfahrungsberichte”) from lower units. The General Staff as a rule demanded that these “Erfahrungsberichte” be as critical, honest and accurate as possible. In general lower commanders were not afraid to issue reports in this spirit, indicating a high level of trust and honesty between echelons. The General Staff used the results of analysis for the continuous improvement of doctrine and tactics and their translation in training programs, which it developed in close collaboration with the Replacement Army (Hart, 2001; Murray, 1981, 1992).
As a final aspect, the German Army’s personnel administration consistently and ostensibly rewarded good combat performance. Leave was more readily granted to front-line troops, veterans and married men, equitable across ranks. It was systematically used as a reward of brave deeds by men in particular. In such cases it was immediately granted, with an endorsement by the army commander. Decorations were awarded for independent action and bravery, with higher requirements for officers than for men. They were cumulative, rewarding repeated acts of bravery. Decisions on higher decorations were taken by Hitler personally, on recommendation of the direct superior and corps or army commander, often within two to five weeks and surrounded by broad military media coverage. However, military justice was harsh and often draconian, with 11,753 men executed for desertion and undermining morale, which probably led to relatively low desertion rates. Men were as well protected against their officers as the other way round. The harsh system was given a “human face” by the veterans and by relative lenience on private transgressions, like drunkenness and women in the barracks (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
In comparison to the German Army, the US Army in World War II grew rapidly, and for that reason had to be centrally organized. In its internal organization it adhered to principles of scientific management. Its command and control systems relied on large amounts of detailed information, collected by large staff units and applied in detailed orders from the higher echelons downward (“Befehlstaktik”, with General Patton as a notable exception). The US Army strove for an optimal and efficient distribution of men and material, dispersing men and officers randomly over its divisions without considerations of unit cohesion or morale. Officers were primarily selected on the basis of intelligence and rewarded for information procuring and processing, much to the detriment of leadership at the front. Instead of fighting power, the US Army relied on numerical superiority in technology and equipment to overwhelm its enemies (Dunivan, 2003; Leonhard, 1993; Hart, 2001; Van Creveld, 1983).
Further, in comparison to the German Army, the British Army in World War II was characterized by a considerable degree of decentralization, with the regiments as foci of organization, identification and communication. This characteristic hampered the adoption of army wide doctrine and the formation, development and training of coherent fighting units above regimental level, such as brigade and division. Further, continuity and cohesion suffered from regimentally-induced wholesale replacements of battalions inside divisions, from the rotation of battalions between the Home Command and field commands, and from frequent leadership changes at senior levels. The latter problem, combined with the lack of army wide doctrine, led to radically different operational styles, meaning that divisions and higher had to learn a new way of waging war with each new commander (French, 2001; Hart, 2001; Heginbotham, 2000; Mutch, 2006).
Battlefield performanceThe differences in degrees of configuration towards fighting power between the German Army on the one hand and the US and British Armies on the other seem to be related to battlefield performance. When looking at actual battle engagements between German and Allied forces during World War II, it may be argued that the Germans rather clearly prevailed in most of them. Quantitative evidence comes from Dupuy (1984, 1986), who has developed a model for battle engagements with two measures, combat effectiveness and score effectiveness.
The first measure, Combat Effectiveness Value, is concerned with the ratio of relative combat outcomes and combat power. In a formula it is defined as: CEV = (Rg/Ra)(Pg/Pa), whereby CEVg = 1/CEVa. In this formula P represents Combat Power, which in its turn is defined as: P = S x V. Here S represents Force Strength (sum of operational lethality indexes for the weapons inventories of each side, modified for the effects of weather, terrain and season), and V represents Variables affecting the employment of the force under the circumstances existing as the time of the engagement (most importantly posture, terrain, weather, mobility, and vulnerability). Calculating P values for the German and Allied sides in the engagements results in Pg/Pa ratios. Further, in the CEV formula R represents Result, the actual outcomes of engagements defined by three sub measures (mission accomplishment, spatial effectiveness, and casualty effectiveness). Calculating R values for the German and Allied sides in the engagements results in Rg/Ra ratios.
Applying the CEV formula to 81 engagements between German and Allied forces in Southern and North Western Europe between 1943-1944, Dupuy discovered that the German R/R values were usually higher than their P/P values and the reverse for the Allies. In all 81 engagements the German CEV usually was between 1.1 and 1.3, the Allied CEV between 0.7 and 0.9. The actual outcomes of these engagements could thus only be predicted with the equations “when it was assumed that, man for man and unit for unit, the Germans were 20-30 % more effective than the British and American forces facing them” (Dupuy, 1984: 253).
Further, applying the same analysis to 14 engagements at the Eastern front showed a German CEV of about 3.0 (1941) to 2.5 (1943) to 1.8 (1944). This indicates that in 1941 German combat effectiveness superiority over the Russians was close to 200 %, meaning that on the average one German division was a match for at least three Russian divisions of comparable size and firepower. In 1944, when the course of war had turned decisively in favor of the Russian forces, this superiority was still nearly 100 % (Dupuy, 1984; 1986).
The second measure, Score Effectiveness, is not concerned with outcomes and weapons. Instead it counts the number of men and the number of casualties (killed, wounded, missing) on both sides of an engagement, from which a score is calculated, i.e. the average number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by blocks of 100 men on each side. The Score Effectiveness is calculated by dividing the score by a constant, the value of which depends on posture (1 for attack, 1.2 for delaying resistance, 1.3 for hasty defense, 1.5 for prepared defense, and 1.6 for fortified defense) (Dupuy, 1984, 1986).
When in all 81 engagements at the Western front the German Score Effectiveness was divided by the Allied one a differential of 1 : 1.52 was obtained. This differential held for Germans attacking or defending, for Germans fighting with numerical superiority or inferiority, for Germans fighting British or American troops, for Germans winning or losing. Dupuy (1984: 253) concluded: “On a man for man basis the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 % higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances.”
At the Eastern front in 1941 the average German frontline soldier inflicted 7.78 Russian casualties for each German lost, but this differential plummeted in the course of the campaign. Still, in 1944 the Germans on a man-for-man basis inflicted about 300 % more casualties than they incurred from the opposing Russians. Further, a calculation of Score Effectiveness in the Polish campaign (1939) indicated a German casualty-inflicting superiority of nearly 4 to 1, indicating a German combat effectiveness superiority of close to 2 to 1 (Dupuy, 1984; 1986).
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper the notion of organizational Gestalt or configuration has been conceptually developed and refined and related to battlefield performance, in an extension of performance indicators normally used in the literature. It has been argued that the German Army in World War II to a comparatively high degree was configured towards fighting power. Its philosophy of war acknowledged the existence of environmental uncertainty and turbulence and emphasized the need for a decentralized approach to adapt to it. Its internal organization concentrated on combat effectiveness and delegated supporting functions to the rear. It selected its officers and NCOs primarily on the basis of character and trained them towards decisive combat leadership. It selected, trained and organized its men in ways that bolstered unit cohesion and morale. Its General Staff played an important role at the higher levels of command. Its system of personnel administration consistently and ostensibly rewarded good combat performance.
When compared to the German Army in terms of the theoretical framework of this paper, the US Army may be regarded as a functional whole or system, in which the parts were as efficiently as possible organized into the organizational whole. However, the US Army’s organizational elements seemed less configured toward fighting power as a single principle than those of the German Army, which often sacrificed organizational efficiency for combat effectiveness. By identical comparison, the British Army may be regarded as an aggregate whole, in which the regiments constituted fairly independent elements. Within the regiments elements were more closely configured towards fighting power, but the lack of an army-wide “Gestaltung” of elements made the British Army vulnerable in large-scale battle engagements, as Dupuy’s equations attest.
Current organizations that strive for high internal configuration and good performance can definitely learn from German army organization and personnel management. This holds for army organizations, some of which already have attempted to incorporate German doctrine and principles, especially the doctrine of mission tactics (“Auftragstaktik”), be it with varying degrees of success (e.g., Boothe, 2005; Leonhard, 1993; Vogelaar and Kramer, 2004).1 This also holds for civilian organizations that more or less share army features, like prisons, correctional facilities, police forces, hospitals, mental institutions and fire departments. These organizations regularly deal with emotionally intense life-death emergency situations, they acknowledge the necessity of strong unit cohesion and clear leadership in such emergencies, and they are all more or less characterized by a inclusive atmosphere (Visser, 2007a).
Comments By Veteran7
This study left out a number of important influences that had a profound influence on the Wehrmacht.:
(1)Hitler was hated for covert reasons the reader will not find described in any book published by the US military or mainline US publishers. Hitler was the first, and last (since Napoleon), leader of a European nation that came from the working or lower middle classes. His genius was not fettered by European class distinctions or his lack of a college degree. The upper classes, to include the very rich and families of the feudal nobility, have controlled Europe for over a thousand years. That feudal power has never been destroyed for all time. Even now the European Union is nothing more than a feudal empire of strongly controlled duchies or nation states run by the same type of feudal arrangement developed before the middle ages. Hitler was hated, and is still hated by the so-called rich nobility of Europe as an “upstart commoner,” “a little corporal.” Hitler was a white man of common origins and not one of the feudalists’ favored minorities, which further exacerbated their hatred. Feudalist realize that it is from the white working and lower middle classes that the greatest threats to feudal hegemony will always arise.
That feudal hatred was most pronounced among the rich Jews and the communists both of which readily adapted to feudalism. The barrage of anti-Hitler hatred continues today, over five decades past the end of the Third Reich, such is the power that the feudalists still hold on world opinion, especially in the feudal Marxist-Capitalist states of America and Canada.
(2) Hitler actually represented the people of Germany and strove to improve their lot in life, both nationally and individually. Actual representation of the best interests of the majority, infuriates feudalists because they never represent anyone’s best interests except their own and the interests of their favored minority vassals. The leaders of Europe were, and are corrupt, and Hitler is still hated for his lack of domestic corruption.
(3) Hitler proclaimed that any German citizen, man or woman, with enough intelligence and drive, could become an officer or leader in Germany. That very statement went against every fiber of control and corruption valued by the western nations where only the upper classes or college graduates, imbued with a leftist-Marxist ideology, may become leaders.
(4) The power of international Jewry was so influential in Europe, America and Britain that their hatred of Hitler has been continuously broadcast for decades by every controlled media and educational unit. The center of gravity of that continuous barrage of hatred against Hitler was the depiction of Hitler as a “Jew killer.” That theme of Hitler-hatred, has as its centerpiece, the holocaust. The strength of resistance to the truth of the holocaust, and research refuting its every claim, has been considered so dangerous by the west that Germany and other nations now jail anyone who speaks against the holocaust religion.
(5) Such profound hatred of Hitler and the fact that both Britain and the USSR had insinuated deep penetration agents within the German General staff and High Command is what really doomed Hitler. A massive conspiracy of silence has disallowed the truth, about the true nature and activities of anti-Hitler conspirators inside the German Army, to ever be known. A drumfire of lies has constantly depicted Germany’s treasonous army officers as “heroes.” This propaganda has gone on for the past seventy-five years.
This year the latest major propaganda effort in that direction will be broadcast as a movie entitled Valkyrie, starring Tom Cruise, a member of a leftist religious cult. The movie Valkyrie tells again the lie that the German officers who plotted against Germany were really trying to help Germany by killing Hitler. In fact, the real story has been emerging for the past decade. German traitor including a number of generals and General Staff officers, sabotaged the German war effort since 1935 with a plethora of treasonous and operational sabotage efforts. Their sabotage caused the deaths of millions of German soldiers and Germany’s military defeat. Only now are the details of their evil machinations beginning to be revealed. The plotters had a mixed bag of motivations, none of which served the interests of the German people. Some wanted "anybody but a commoner"to run Germany, some wanted a return to monarchy, most of the conspirators wanted Russia's Marxism to control, and some served Britain's Marxist-Capitalism. They all shared a certain cowardice and a ruthless desire to cause the deaths of millions of Germans so that Germany would lose the war.
The above controversial musings may discomfort some people who only believe what the media tells them. I ask that you spend more than a decade researching the above historical events, as I have, and then draw your own conclusions, that is, unless your mind has been made up for you.
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