Maneuver Redux

Maneuver Redux

Future battles may be conducted in an environment which is unevenly lethal, usually non-linear, and often uncertain. The lethality of many nation’s weapons has not improved dramatically in the past 20 years. High technology is not the prerequisite for victory, in fact it sometimes causes defeat. Expert human warriors organized into maneuver oriented, cohesive shock groups, are the best guarantee of victory. Soldiers who: lose battles, are not allowed to win, are punished for initiative, are not rewarded for heroism, are allowed to be humiliated, and who are distrusted and arrested, will not remain in the armed forces. On the non-linear battlefield some units will be required to employ greater dispersion and increased speed of movement if they are to survive. Forces opposing each other should no longer advance within well-defined linear boundaries. Opportunities for success on the battlefield will appear fleetingly as units maneuver to exploit gaps and gain the initiative. Control of the battlefield will
not be emphasized. Commanders will be forced to make rapid decisions, often in the face of conflicting information and uncertainty.Maneuver Warfare and the Modern BattlefieldThe Philosophy of Maneuver Warfare, oriented towards winning battles, campaigns and wars, exploits the nonlinear environment, and advocates that success will largely depend on our ability to adapt to constantly changing situations. (Adaptation is one measure of intelligence.) Current USMC doctrine (The USMC does not utilize maneuver warfare. No US ground force can use maneuver warfare because the emphasis is upon machine roboticism, micromanagement and diplomacy) defines Maneuver Warfare as "an approach to warfare that emphasizes disrupting the cohesion of the enemy's tactical units and the mental process of the enemy commander - his ability to make correct and timely decisions - rather than simply inflicting casualties at a greater rate than they are sustained."Maneuver Warfare is a way of fighting smart, of out-thinking an opponent that may be resistant to being overpowered only with brute strength. That does not mean that paying tribute/bribes, handing out money and constantly begging for peace, is a substitute for attrition and somehow is related to maneuver.Maneuver Warfare is based on the fact that a battle consists of two forces pitted against each other. The actions of each force causes the other to modify existing plans. The force which can consistently regroup, replan and react first will gain and maintain the initiative.In a successful battle, the enemy is continually forced to modify his plans in reference to his opponent. After each modification, however, it is necessary for the friendly force to conduct further actions so that the enemy's plan repeatedly needs revision. At each repetition, the enemy's response is increasingly inappropriate until, eventually, his organization loses cohesion and he is forced to disengage or face destruction.To force an enemy to alter his plan it is necessary to surprise him, frequently by relentless drives into the enemy entrails. To achieve surprise, that is to do something unexpected, requires some risk. If all risk is minimized, then the chosen course will be apparent and surprise will not be achieved. The acceptance of risk is essential to the attainment of surprise. Having achieved surprise, the commander must now act more quickly than the enemy can react. Given the chaos which will reign on the battlefield, the commander's aim must be not to try to impose order, but rather to organize himself and his battle groups to cope with the disorder quicker than his opponent. A responsive initiative-oriented, expert command system, is necessary. Amateur commands applying analysis in a machine environment will invariably lose in the long run.Maneuver Warfare is not a new concept. While the Germans and Soviets have often been regarded as the premier exponents of the "maneuver" style of war, they have not been alone. Other countries have for many years advocated similar philosophies. For example, a decade ago, Quikmaneuvers’ theorists developed a list of concepts for commanders on the confused battlefield. That creed included the following points:
Ø Continuous reconnaissance and effective intelligence (recon forces equal to 30% of combat forces) recon-pull
Ø Widespread use of advance detachments and desant
Ø Rapid exploitation of crucial intelligence
Ø Activnost, leaders who can think on the move (see Grenadier by Kurt “panzer” Myer) act boldly on contact,
Ø seek surprise
Ø do not delay, do something and do it right away
Ø seek gaps, avoid surfaces, reinforce success
Ø identify a schwerpunt on offense and on defense,
Ø shift the schwerpunkt as necessary
Ø battles can be won even when all troops are not fully briefed if officers are well trained, ideologically motivated and discipline is tight
Ø the unexpected immediate action usually achieves surprise
Ø when the battle hangs in the balance quick decision is more likely to succeed than a deliberate estimate and plan
Ø Generals lead from the front,
Ø staffs are support functions not command authorities
Ø If a general depends on his staff for thinking, the general is eliminated
Ø Ruthlessness and tempo guide the action
Ø Victory, not end states, is the objective
Ø Every soldier must be imbued with the concept of seizing the initiative
Ø Soldiers must be trusted without command use of: micromanagement, ROE commissars, journalistic interference and other detrimental concepts now paralyzing , for example, US armed forces
Ø Victory must be obtained at the operational level
Ø Logistics must be reorganized to fuel the battle
Ø Probe, Pin and maneuver
Ø Infiltration by desant targeted against enemy HQs and logistics nodes
Ø Widespread use of landmines
Ø Preserve the combat lethality of the force by any means necessary.

Of course, some of the above concepts appear controversial and they are unworkable in the US, Canuckistan and Western European armed forces which do not fight to win. They fight for end states.In order to understand maneuver warfare, it must be explained and rehearsed, first with written or paper war games and then actual war games.