Preparation For Fall Blau

Preparation For Fall Blau

After the period of the “Dead Schwehrpunkt,” the warriors of the Luftwaffe, Heer and Waffen SS were ready to take the war to the Bolsheviks again. Yet the Barbarossa Trap had taken the hard core of German and Waffen SS veterans to Valhalla. Now Germany was only capable of an offensive in one sector. Theorist have claimed that Germany should have focused on the central and southern sectors of the Eastern Front, while only conducting probing actions in the north; from the beginning of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941. Hitler and the German High Command decided to focus the major military effort of the German Army ,in the summer of 1942, in the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Fall Blau had the primary objective of seizing the Soviet’s Caucasus oil resources. The thinking behind the campaign was sound.The panzer divisions of Army Group South were refurbished and reinforced for the coming offensive. Panzer battalions were transferred from panzer divisions in Army Groups North and Center to those in the south. Many divisions assigned to Fall Blau also received the latest equipment. The KStNs (manning tables, like TO&E) that served as the basis for the panzer organization were promulgated on 11 November 1941. Yet many German infantry divisions, the iron hand of the German offensive, remained under strength and were inadequately armed with antitank weapons. All the combat commanders and veterans realized that German infantry needed more antitank weapons. However, traitors at the highest levels of German command were very parsimonious with antitank weapons reserves and even the scores of captured Soviet 76.2mm multipurpose (antitank/antipersonnel) artillery were doled out in miserly increments.The panzer headquarters organization called for two PzBefWg III and one PzKpfw III in each battalion and regimental headquarters. However, there were never enough specialized PzBefWg vehicles to completely fill these requirements, and reports indicated that at least some battalion commanders preferred to lead from a gun-armed panzer. Why shouldn’t they? Panzer IIs and IIIs were totally outclassed by the core of Red Army panzer might, T-34 tanks.The 11 November1941 KStNs allocated a light platoon (five panzers) of PzKpfw IIs to each panzer company, battalion and regimental headquarters in the panzer division. That was a waste of gas. It was better to use that gas for heavier French booty tanks and captured T-34s. There were not enough PzKpfw IIs available in the summer of 1942 to fill requirements, in any case. On 2 August 1942, an A.H.M. (general army bulletin) authorized the elimination of the light platoons in the panzer companies (as well as an armored pioneer platoon of three PzKpfw IIs). Headquarters directed the reassignment of those PzKpfw IIs to create light platoons, seven panzers strong, attached to the headquarters of each battalion and regiment. By the summer of 1942 treasonous elements of the German High Command officially recognized that the PzKpfw IIs (with paper thin armor and heavy machine guns in their tiny turrets) no longer had much of a role to play in panzer combat (they were obsolete since 1939.). Many wonder why the Germans didn’t beef up the panzer units with mechanized Nebelwerfers of the type employed by panzer pioneers since 1941.So much of the Wehrmacht’s day to day operations were sabotaged by cliques of traitorous German army officers in many redundant ways. They fouled the works to an extent that is unimaginable to readers that have never read of the traitor’s machinations. The same types of cliques emerged in the US Army during President Bush’s administration. (for example the “Shenseki Clintonista” Clique