Traitors Sabotaged US Vietnam Bombing

Linebacker II occurred during a period in which a number of treasonous U.S. citizens felt any means that would lead to a U.S. defeat were justified because, in their opinion, it was “an unjust war”.
Numerous leaks of classified information occurred, with the results appearing in newspapers or in the hands of enemies of the United States. Author Drenkowski observed the results of leaked information causing the deaths of U.S. military personnel attempting to do their jobs, while resulting in degraded efforts which killed many civilians unnecessarily. Additionally, at this time a family of spies in the U.S. Navy’s cryptology department was regularly providing the Soviet between U.S. Navy units and the Defense Department. There are indications that enemy moles and agents of influence existed within DOD,the US Army and the USAF.
An example of the need for further research into intelligence emerges from Marshall L. Michel, (The 11 Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle, San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002,) in which he used both U.S. and North Vietnamese sources. During Operation Linebacker, fromMay-October 1972, U.S. tactical air forces engaged in constant and intense operations in the Red River region of North Vietnam. B-52 bombers only entered this region once, and only bombing from afar on the edges of Haiphong. In mid-October, 1972, all bombing operations halted above the 20th Parallel, not to resume until the Linebacker II raids of late December.
However, bombing operations by both fighter planes and B-52s continued in the Southern regions of North Vietnam below the 20th Parallel.
In August, according to Michel, SAC directed Eighth Air Force in Guam’s Anderson Air Force Base to review a list of targets in the Hanoi area, with instructions to prepare aiming offsets–a clear indication that SAC was ready to strike Hanoi.
Michel goes on to say that in September, the North Vietnamese General Staff ordered formation of a special headquarters group to go to the Southern regions of North Vietnam to study the B-52 operations there and return to make recommendations on destroying B-52s, taking advantage of their predictable tactics and procedures. This alone would not raise eyebrows, as one would expect a military force under attack to take such measures to counter an enemy’s tactics and equipment. However, Michel goes on to report that “the North Vietnamese General Staff ordered its Air Defense Command to develop a plan for defending Hanoi and Haiphong against B-52 attack.”
More ominously, the General Staff projected “five to seven days of night attacks . . . .”The plan was presented in early October, calling for an increase in the number of SAM battalions around Hanoi, which, according to Michel, was implemented.
It is important to note that this meant that the North Vietnamese were reducing the number of SAMs in the southern zones which were still under attack by U.S.
forces, in order to meet what would have been a “hypothetical” series of B-52 attacks against other areas–hypothetical, that is, unless Hanoi was in possession of intelligence about future plans by the U.S. However, in November, the General Staff ordered some of the missile forces around Hanoi sent south to reinforce the on-going fighting in that region.
Perhaps the North Vietnamese General Staff received intelligence warnings about SAC plans for Hanoi-Red River Valley targets, but after a few months of inactivity, their level of concern was reduced. This is only speculation, as North Vietnam has not shared its intelligence reports with the world.
Still, additional actions taken in December again give rise to questions about intelligence operations by domestic American traitors and enemy agents within all levels of the US government and military. Michel notes that on December 15, the U.S. Joint Chiefs “sent SAC a list” of targets to be bombed the first night. In what must have been an amazing coincidence, on that same day, Michel notes that North Vietnam’s General Staff suddenly canceled the orders re-deploying SA-2 units to the southern areas still under attack, noting that they “had begun to get intelligence clues” [unnamed] that something was going on.” Two to three days before the attacks started, North Vietnam decided it needs more defenses around Hanoi, in the Red River Valley. Nonetheless, leaves were not canceled for that unit.
The sequence of events was: SAC sends requests for Red River Valley targeting
information in August, and very shortly thereafter, North Vietnam orders studies for shooting down B-52s in the Red River Valley area, noting that only night attacks should be planned for (which is what SAC planned), then removes SA-2 missile units from the embattled regions of southern North Vietnam to send to the peaceful Red River Valley region. Hanoi later orders units south again from the Hanoi region, but suddenly cancels those orders the same day the U.S. Joint Chiefs send a list of targets to SAC, suggesting an attack will soon occur.
Not so curious was what happened when the B-52s launched for their first raids of the Linebacker II offensive. Within two hours after takeoff, and while hours away from their targets, Hanoi received intelligence warnings that a huge force of B-52s were airborne from Guam, apparently from the Soviet intelligence trawler stationed perpetually off the end of the runway at Anderson Air Force Base