Soviet Mine Clearing on Roads

From the beginning of the Chechnya conflict in December 1994 until the summer of 1995, Chechen forces seldom used mines against the Russian forces. In July or August 1995, Chechen forces began using mines regularly and they continued to use them until the end of the conflict in 1996. The Chechens did not employ many conventional mines but improvised them using artillery rounds, aviation munitions, grenades, and other explosives. They also employed captured Russian mines, including directional mines, which they mounted off the ground to explode on the flanks or above vehicles and personnel. Most of the Chechen mines were laid on or adjacent to roads and highways. As a result of their experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya, the Russian sappers have developed new techniques for clearing roads in a counterinsurgency.

A Russian motorized rifle regiment normally is given responsibility for clearing roads. If the entire regiment is going to physically move on the road, the regiment constitutes a Movement Support Detachment (OOD--otryad obespecheniya dvizheniya), which includes a tank with a mine roller, a sapper squad mounted on a BTR (wheeled personnel carrier), and scouts and mine-clearing personnel. The OOD moves in front of the regiment and clears the road. If the regiment is responsible for clearing and securing a portion of a road on a long-term basis (such as protecting lines of communication in Afghanistan or Chechnya), the Russians deploy a mine reconnaissance detachment to check the section of road that the regiment maintains. The mine reconnaissance detachment normally consists of a tank with a mine roller, a sapper squad mounted on its BTR, and a covering force mounted on two or three BMPs (tracked armored personnel carriers). As they move, the tank uses its main gun to blast any suspicious objects, such as piles of trash or burned-out vehicles. The sappers must be particularly alert in areas where the enemy might employ command-detonated mines. Once the regiment's section of road is cleared, the regimental commander reports this fact to his higher headquarters. No convoy movement is allowed on the road until all commanders have reported that their sections are cleared.

So-called "green zones" were a constant source of trouble in Afghanistan. A green zone is an agricultural area of gardens and vineyards that is bisected by a network of irrigation ditches. In Afghanistan, green zones provided concealment for guerrilla forces and were practically impassible for vehicles. The green zones in many parts of the country bordered highways and provided optimum sites for ambush. Antitank mines, antipersonnel mines, and command-detonated mines were easily concealed in the edges of green zones, where ambush parties and snipers preyed on dismounted scouts and sappers.

The Russians now recommend the formation shown in the illustration for clearing roads. A tank or BMP pushing a mine roller moves in front of the formation. On its flanks and slightly ahead move dismounted motorized riflemen and sappers with electronic mine detectors, who clear snipers and ambushes. The mine detection group, equipped with mine-detection dogs, follows some 40 or 50 meters behind the tank. They carefully look for mines on the road and road shoulders. Sappers with electronic mine detectors move on the road about 15-20 meters behind the mine detection group. Walking on the right and left sides of the road, two or three sappers with electronic mine detectors and mine probes clear an area about 20-40 meters on the flanks of the road. A covering force of dismounted motorized riflemen follow the sappers who clear the flanks. The BTR and BMPs follow the dismounted party and the mine reconnaissance detachment commander (usually a platoon leader), who controls the activity from the middle of the formation. The average clearing speed of such a formation is about two kilometers per hour. The vulnerability of the sappers to snipers and ambush in Afghanistan and Chechnya was a problem for the Soviets/Russians. This formation protects the sappers with both dismounted infantry and vehicle-mounted direct-fire weapons.

In addition to using dogs, electronic mine detectors, and probes, Russian sappers are taught to look for signs of soil disturbance, soil discoloration, dents or depressions on the earth's surface, and other signals. Such signals include tunneling, broken branches and debris, trash associated with mines or demolitions, trip wires, wire leading away from the site, patches in road work, loose cobblestones, or other indications of mining. When a member of the detachment finds a mine, the detachment stops and the finder marks the mine's location with a small red flag. The detachment commander and an experienced sapper move to the site and examine the mine. If the commander decides to destroy it, every member of the group draws a circle on the ground where he is standing and marks it with the first letter of his last name and whatever else is necessary to find it again. All the members, except the one-man demolition party, then move behind the armored vehicles or into a ditch for protection. The demolition party places an electrically-primed charge on the mine, moves to a safe location, and detonates the charge. After the mine blows up, the group members return to their last location and resume the search. If the commander decides to disarm the mine, a single sapper is given the mission. He carefully examines the area within a radius of at least 1.5 meters around the mine for other mines, trip wires, or detonator wires. Then he carefully scrapes the concealing layer off the mine; exposes the sides of the mine; and looks for antilift devices, other mines underneath the first, and booby traps. He removes the mine fuze and uses a grappling hook and rope to pull the mine from the hole. He then examines the hole to check for additional mines. Disarmed mines are collected for destruction or evacuation.

Contemporary Russian Formation for Clearing Roads

Distance is in meters (m)
1. Tank with mine roller.
2. Mine detection group with dogs and their search pattern.
3. Russian sappers clear road flanks.
4. Sappers with electronic mine detectors clear a road.
5. Detachment commander.
6. Covering force.

7. Sappers moving with flank security elements.

New Information about Soviet Tactics

A few new books about the Soviets and the Red Army are available at QuikManeuvers.com
Out recently, one about the NKVD Secret Police, and two of the newest series called Espionage Manuals: Soviet Spy Methods, and Soviet Defector and Tradecraft
An interesting book about to be released on Soviet Battle Norms (for those of you who are scholars of the Military Sciences) should be available later this week.
See what QuikManeuvers books are available on the Red Army and Soviets

A History Lesson...

Red Army World War II forces created special assault (or “storm”) detachments and groups, specifically developed for independent action in urban terrain. Each detachment included a rifle battalion, a sapper company, an armor company or self-propelled assault gun battery, two mortar batteries, a cannon or howitzer battery, 1 or 2 batteries of divisional artillery, and a flamethrower platoon.
The detachment was subdivided into 3 to 6 assault groups as well as a support group and a reserve. Each assault group, in essence a rifle company (the source says “platoon or company,” but the structure described seems more appropriate to a company), included 1 or 2 sapper detachments, an anti-tank rifle detachment, 2 to 5 individually carried flamethrowers, smoke devices, 3 or 4 other man-portable weapons, and 2 or 3 tanks or self-propelled assault guns. If necessary, groups could be further subdivided to better focus specifically on such missions as fire, command, reserves, reconnaissance, and obstacle clearing. Individual soldiers were supplied with a large number of grenades and explosives. Training and preparation for the urban environment emphasized independent thought and action from each soldier and warned of the pitfalls of standardized procedure.

Was all of this forgotten between the years of World War II and the post–Cold War battles in Grozny? To an extent, it was. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Soviet analysts and soldiers diligently studied the urban fighting of the past, but as time went on, attention focused elsewhere. By the 1980s, urban combat was no longer the focus of in-depth exercises, and military textbooks ignored the issue almost entirely. By 1994, neither the Ministry of Defense nor any of the other government organizations with troops at their command had any forces geared specifically to urban combat. The last such force was dissolved in February 1994, at which time 400 of its 430 officers retired.
This is not to say that Russian forces were entirely untrained for operations in urban environments. The overall excellently prepared Spetsnaz (special forces units) and paratroopers continued to train for some urban contingencies. The preparation of Spetsnaz and FSB snipers, for instance, focused almost exclusively on urban situations. But with the end of the Cold War, the prognosis for urban deployments was that they would involve primarily small-scale counter terrorist actions, not full-blown warfare. Therefore, the special forces and others prepared for exactly this sort of contingency and Russian urban training sites supported such counter terrorism preparation, as well as perhaps some peacekeeping training. As a result, the motorized rifle troops that formed the bulk of the force in Grozny continued to prepare for the open-terrain warfare that was expected when the Cold War turned hot. Only five or six of the 151total hours of squad, platoon, and company tactical training mandated by Russian training standards for forces bound for battle were dedicated to the urban environment.

ALSO
Some related and interesting information that we uncovered about Soviet Special Forces is worth the read. Check out our other blog, dedicated to Special Ops... http://specialops-voa.blogspot.com