The Organizational Weapon

War is fought at all levels. Many Americans think that war only occurs on the battlefield. For over 7 decades a secret war, against people who are defenseless, has been fought. The main weapon of that relentless war is the Organizational Weapon.

Every Main Group in America is Now Controlled By the Left/Socialists (including, for example, the AARP). The reds got their control of America By employing the Organizational Weapon. I learned how to employ this weapon at the US Army Psychological Warfare School

The Organizational Weapon:A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics:By: Philip Selznick. Published By Rand Publications. Obtainable For Free on the Internet

This book is a work of prime importance. Professor Selznick has excellently delineated the strategy and tactics used by communists in their general revolutionary quest. This work will yield the discerning reader much insight into the fundamental structure of modern society. For, in portraying the ways in which communists seek to gain control over crucial groups and organizations, Selznick brings out, the basic lines of control in modern society. In this important sense the volume turns out to be a far more penetrating analysis of the organization of modern life than is contained in the host of theoretical and research studies currently made by sociologists in the field of social organization.

In depicting bolshevik strategy and tactics Professor Selznick has relied on a careful scrutiny of the writings of Leninists and Stalinists, the commentaries of others, records of investigations and hearings dealing with communist activities, and seemingly a considerable body of security materials of the Federal government. He is remarkably at home in these materials, recognizing the essentials in the vast body of materials on communist procedure, understanding their implications and grasping their interrelations.

A digest of the main lines of his analysis can be given, although at the expense of the richness of insight attending the discussion. The objective of the communists, Selznick shows, is not so much to indoctrinate the masses of people with an ideology, or to seize control of the Government in traditional revolutionary style, but instead to seek conquest of the strategic functioning units in a society—groups such as labor unions, veteran organizations, youth groups, the unemployed, indeed any group which offers a base for expanding operations. Thus, the effort of communists becomes primarily one of seeking initial toeholds (entryism) in groups and institutions which will offer in turn means of moving progressively to greater conquests of power until the control of the social apparatus of a society is secured. The foundationfor this line of effort is the formation of the communist party—a "combat party"consisting of an elite of reliable agents who are thoroughlyindoctrinated, skillfully trained and rigidly disciplined. The integrity of the combat party is developed and preserved by the psychological insulation of its members and by the rigid prohibition of internal disputes over aims or objectives. Such measures bring about a reliable and tightly-knit membership which may be mobilized, manipulated, deployed and directed as needed by the policy and strategy of the directing leadership.
The combat party is the instrument employed to utilize and direct for party ends the potential energy resident in the mass of people. The mass is conceived not as an amorphous and diffused aggregate but as consisting of specialized groups and organizations which are favor-ably located and which are or may be sources of power. Such groups and institutions become the targets for the power seeking efforts of the communists. There are four principles or demands by which the combat party is guided in this power-seeking quest:
(1) to develop means of access to the groups which are its targets;
(2) to neutralize competing elites which may be striving to control such target groups;
(3) to legitimate whatever positions of power that are gained so that such power positions are recognized and accepted by peopleas sanctioned authority; and
(4) to mobilize the captured groups so that they can be set in motion along the lines desired by the party.
Professor Selznick analyzes effectively
(a) the bodies of strategy developed by communists with regard to these four demands and
(b) many of the operating tactics employed to implement these strategies.
Here are a few of the strategies : the formation of small concealed cadres in the target groups; their mutual efforts to gain official positions; the discrediting of officials and inner groups who stand in their way; the readiness to espouse vigorously the objectives of the target organizations as a means of moving into power; entering into united fronts in such manner as to make impossible demands and then throw on other groups the onus for the breakdown of the united front; the carrying on of conspiratorial activity behind and beyond the facade of the legitimate tasks of official positions.

The quest for power by communists is marked by high adaptability and expediency in tactics. In an ultimate sense the communists seek to develop progressively a net work of power and control inside of established groups and institutions and, thus, to be in a position at the propitious time to displace constitutional authority in a given society.

Learn it. Practice it for obtaining freedom, not communism.

Traitors Sabotaged US Vietnam Bombing

Linebacker II occurred during a period in which a number of treasonous U.S. citizens felt any means that would lead to a U.S. defeat were justified because, in their opinion, it was “an unjust war”.
Numerous leaks of classified information occurred, with the results appearing in newspapers or in the hands of enemies of the United States. Author Drenkowski observed the results of leaked information causing the deaths of U.S. military personnel attempting to do their jobs, while resulting in degraded efforts which killed many civilians unnecessarily. Additionally, at this time a family of spies in the U.S. Navy’s cryptology department was regularly providing the Soviet between U.S. Navy units and the Defense Department. There are indications that enemy moles and agents of influence existed within DOD,the US Army and the USAF.
An example of the need for further research into intelligence emerges from Marshall L. Michel, (The 11 Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle, San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002,) in which he used both U.S. and North Vietnamese sources. During Operation Linebacker, fromMay-October 1972, U.S. tactical air forces engaged in constant and intense operations in the Red River region of North Vietnam. B-52 bombers only entered this region once, and only bombing from afar on the edges of Haiphong. In mid-October, 1972, all bombing operations halted above the 20th Parallel, not to resume until the Linebacker II raids of late December.
However, bombing operations by both fighter planes and B-52s continued in the Southern regions of North Vietnam below the 20th Parallel.
In August, according to Michel, SAC directed Eighth Air Force in Guam’s Anderson Air Force Base to review a list of targets in the Hanoi area, with instructions to prepare aiming offsets–a clear indication that SAC was ready to strike Hanoi.
Michel goes on to say that in September, the North Vietnamese General Staff ordered formation of a special headquarters group to go to the Southern regions of North Vietnam to study the B-52 operations there and return to make recommendations on destroying B-52s, taking advantage of their predictable tactics and procedures. This alone would not raise eyebrows, as one would expect a military force under attack to take such measures to counter an enemy’s tactics and equipment. However, Michel goes on to report that “the North Vietnamese General Staff ordered its Air Defense Command to develop a plan for defending Hanoi and Haiphong against B-52 attack.”
More ominously, the General Staff projected “five to seven days of night attacks . . . .”The plan was presented in early October, calling for an increase in the number of SAM battalions around Hanoi, which, according to Michel, was implemented.
It is important to note that this meant that the North Vietnamese were reducing the number of SAMs in the southern zones which were still under attack by U.S.
forces, in order to meet what would have been a “hypothetical” series of B-52 attacks against other areas–hypothetical, that is, unless Hanoi was in possession of intelligence about future plans by the U.S. However, in November, the General Staff ordered some of the missile forces around Hanoi sent south to reinforce the on-going fighting in that region.
Perhaps the North Vietnamese General Staff received intelligence warnings about SAC plans for Hanoi-Red River Valley targets, but after a few months of inactivity, their level of concern was reduced. This is only speculation, as North Vietnam has not shared its intelligence reports with the world.
Still, additional actions taken in December again give rise to questions about intelligence operations by domestic American traitors and enemy agents within all levels of the US government and military. Michel notes that on December 15, the U.S. Joint Chiefs “sent SAC a list” of targets to be bombed the first night. In what must have been an amazing coincidence, on that same day, Michel notes that North Vietnam’s General Staff suddenly canceled the orders re-deploying SA-2 units to the southern areas still under attack, noting that they “had begun to get intelligence clues” [unnamed] that something was going on.” Two to three days before the attacks started, North Vietnam decided it needs more defenses around Hanoi, in the Red River Valley. Nonetheless, leaves were not canceled for that unit.
The sequence of events was: SAC sends requests for Red River Valley targeting
information in August, and very shortly thereafter, North Vietnam orders studies for shooting down B-52s in the Red River Valley area, noting that only night attacks should be planned for (which is what SAC planned), then removes SA-2 missile units from the embattled regions of southern North Vietnam to send to the peaceful Red River Valley region. Hanoi later orders units south again from the Hanoi region, but suddenly cancels those orders the same day the U.S. Joint Chiefs send a list of targets to SAC, suggesting an attack will soon occur.
Not so curious was what happened when the B-52s launched for their first raids of the Linebacker II offensive. Within two hours after takeoff, and while hours away from their targets, Hanoi received intelligence warnings that a huge force of B-52s were airborne from Guam, apparently from the Soviet intelligence trawler stationed perpetually off the end of the runway at Anderson Air Force Base