Organizational Gestalten and Valkyrie

Organizational Gestalten and Valkyrie

Excerpts from: “Organizational Gestalt, personnel management and performance: Towards conceptual clarification and empirical extension”By Max Visser


Army organizations relatively seldom have been studied by students of organization and personnel management, probably due to unfamiliarity with (or even repugnance to) military affairs, the dangers in acquiring data, and a shared image of armies as simple, routine-ridden “machines” (Morgan, 1997; Moskos, 1984; Mutch, 2006). This lack of attention, however, does not seem fully justifiable. Armies constitute the world’s oldest large-scale organizations, representing centuries of experience in surviving arguably the most competitive, turbulent and dynamic situation an organization may encounter, i.e., actual war. Moreover, the image of armies as hierarchical and bureaucratic “machines” seems at odds with the degree of flexibility and adaptation current organization theory requires of organizations in turbulent and dynamic situations (March and Weissinger-Baylon, 1986; Wilson, 1989). In other words, army organizations seem to pose an apparent paradox here.
In solving this apparent paradox, the German Army before and in World War II appears as a particularly interesting case from the military and historical literature. This seems surprising, since this army is often associated with a rigid hierarchy (“Befehl ist Befehl”) and strict discipline (“Kadavergehorsam”), which characteristics do not seem conducive to a flexible adaptation to the contingencies of war. Yet, despite this association and in spite of having lost Word War II, military historians generally agree that the German Army was one of the most effective of all armies in that war (e.g., Dupuy, 1984; Hart, 2001; Murray, 1992; Van Creveld, 1983).
In this paper my purpose is to show, first, that the German Army’s organization and personnel management were to a comparatively high degree configured towards fighting power and, second, that this high degree of “Gestaltung” may be positively related to a comparatively strong battlefield performance. Fighting power of an army is defined here as “the sum total of qualities that make armies fight, resting on mental, intellectual, and organizational foundations, and manifest in discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness” (Van Creveld, 1983: 3). Here I abstain from analyzing the quality and quantity of equipment, which, together with fighting power, determines military strength (e.g., Showalter, 2002). Battlefield performance is defined by two measures, combat effectiveness and score effectiveness, discussed below (Dupuy, 1984, 1986).
This paper will proceed as follows. In the second section I will present a theory of organizational part-whole relationships, intended to link various concepts of Gestalt, configuration, system, consistency and simplicity. In the third section I will present an analysis of German army organization, personnel management policies, and fighting power during World War II on the basis of historical and military sources, together with a brief comparison with two Allied armies. The fourth section contains a quantitative analysis of relative battlefield performance, while the paper ends with discussion and conclusions.

The organizational Gestalt

The study of part-whole relationships has been a central theme in a broad scientific and philosophical movement known as Gestalt theory. Initiated by the treatise of Von Ehrenfels on “Gestaltqualitäten” (1890), Gestalt theory made important inroads in early twentieth century Continental philosophy (Ash, 1995; Smith, 1988). In 1912 Wertheimer introduced Gestalt theory in the field of experimental psychology, from which the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology emerged (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1947; Wertheimer 1938). This school inspired further extensions of Gestalt theory to interpersonal relations and group processes, leading to the formulation of field theory (Lewin, 1951), attribution and balance theories (Heider, 1958) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Other applications of Gestalt theory reached the fields of neurology (Goldstein 1939), psychotherapy (Perls, Hefferline and Goodman, 1973) and political science (Visser, 1994ab), while parts of communication science also underwent Gestalt influences (Bateson, 1972; Visser, 2003ab, 2007ab).
The applicability to a diversity of psychological and social phenomena and the firm empirical base Gestalt theory has enjoyed over the years invite an extension to the study of organizational part-whole relationships. Here I propose a theoretical framework on the basis of a logical analysis of the Gestalt concept (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988abc; Simons, 1988; Visser, 1997, 2003b). The framework formulates three criteria for the specification of wholes, which in the remainder of this section I will apply to organizations.
The first criterion refers to the unilateral dependence of a whole on its basis (or fundament). The existence of objects that form the basis of the whole is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the whole itself, but the reverse is not true: a whole cannot exist without constituent parts or elements. In wholes conforming to this criterion there is a low degree of interdependence among constituent elements. Reciprocal determination between parts approaches or equals zero, and no energy and tensions are present between the elements. An example would be a heap of stones lying by the side of the road (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988ac; Simons, 1988).
In the organizational literature this criterion is exemplified in approaches that, for example, look at aggregations of human resource management practices (Bowen and Ostroff, 2004), at combinations of conditions (Lee et al., 2004), and at patterns or integration without specifying the dynamics thereof (Freeman, 1999; Edmondson, 1999). Wholes conforming to this first criterion I propose to label as aggregate wholes.
The second criterion refers to supersummativity, often expressed in the statement that the whole is more than (or different from) the mere sum of its parts. It is a property of a whole which cannot meaningfully be ascribed to the totality of the parts making up that whole. In wholes conforming to the first and the second criterion there is a high degree of interdependence among constituent elements. Reciprocal determination between parts is high, involving energy and tensions. An example would be a charged and isolated conductor: the whole under consideration is the field containing the charges, the parts are the field elements that reciprocally determine each other through the influence of the field’s forces (Köhler, 1947).
Characteristic of such wholes is the fact that their internal processes depend upon the topographical boundaries of the system, but at the same time take place independent of the nature of that system. These internal processes tend toward a state of stationary equilibrium, according to which the distribution of parts and forces display a tendency towards equalization or balance. In Gestalt theory this tendency appears as the law of “Prägnanz” or “good” Gestalt, according to which the organization of wholes will always be as “good” as the prevailing conditions permit. The term “good” refers to properties like regularity, symmetry, and proximity (Koffka, 1935; Wertheimer, 1938).
In the organizational literature this second criterion is exemplified in approaches that, for example, look at patterns that represent non-linear synergistic effects and higher-order interactions (Delery and Doty, 1996), at a holistic stance in which the parts of a social entity take their meaning from the whole (Meyer, Tsui and Hinings, 1993), and at systems that attain a state of consistency or harmony, due to mutual reinforcement among system elements (Miller and Friesen, 1982; Siggelkow, 2002). Wholes conforming to this second criterion I propose to label as functional wholes or systems.
The third criterion refers to the notion of transposition, which refers to all kinds of modification of wholes in which some aspect of form remains constant or invariant. In wholes conforming to the third criterion there is not only a high degree of reciprocal determination between parts, involving energy and tensions, but also an underlying theme or principle that remains constant in all transformations that whole undergoes. An example would be a melody played in different keys (Grelling and Oppenheim, 1988ab; Simons, 1988).
Characteristic of such wholes is their degree of organization in accordance to a single theme or principle. Some wholes are perfectly arranged in accordance with the principle, while other wholes are just barely organized enough to recognize the principle. The law of “Pragnänz” or “good” Gestalt under this criterion takes a somewhat different form than under the second criterion. It may either formally refer to “Prägnanz” as originality (the primacy or autonomy of a phenomenon, its capacity to serve as a prototype), or materially to “Prägnanz” as meaningfulness (in accordance with the specific nature of the given structure, its types of mental set, habits and traditions in relation to a given environment) (Smith, 1988).
In the organizational literature this third criterion is exemplified in approaches that, for example, look at simplicity, the degree to which an organization’s elements are orchestrated by a single theme, principle or workplace philosophy (Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006; Miller, 1996; Mintzberg, 1978). More in general, this criterion is exemplified in chaotic or “fractal” organizations, in which the organization’s core values and mission are patterned into the behavior of its members (Morgan, 1997; Wheatley, 1992). Wholes conforming to the third criterion I propose to label as Gestalten or configurations.

Army organization and fighting power

Comparatively more than the US and British Armies, the German Army’s internal organization and personnel management were configured towards fighting power. I distinguish six interrelated aspects, the first pertaining to organization and the remaining five pertaining to various aspects of personnel management.
As a first aspect, the German philosophy of war acknowledged the existence of environmental uncertainty and turbulence and emphasized the need for a decentralized approach to adapt to it. This philosophy was deeply influenced by the crushing defeat of the Prussian Army at the hands of Napoleon in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806). In reflecting on the causes of defeat, leading military philosophers and practitioners like Von Clausewitz, Von Scharnhorst and Von Moltke gradually came to the fundamental insight that friction, uncertainty and ambiguity are inherent in the “fog of war”. These characteristics should be accepted as given, rather than being contained in vain through detailed planning and upper-echelon hierarchical control (Dunivan 2003; Echevarria, 1996; Frieser, 2005).
To deal effectively with the “fog of war”, German war doctrine increasingly encouraged individual initiative, independent thinking and responsibility at all levels of command. This doctrinal approach became known as “Auftragstaktik”, a command and control system in which commanders were being given missions, rather than orders (“Befehlstaktik”). In this system “the mission must unmistakably express the will of the commander. The objective, course of action and mission constraints, such as time, must be clear and definite without restricting freedom of action more than necessary in order to make use of the initiative of individuals charged with the tasks to be accomplished. Limits as to the method of execution, within the framework of the higher commander’s will, are imposed only where essential for coordination with other commands” (Von Lossow, 1977: 87-88; Uhle-Wetter, 1993; Widder, 2002).
As a second aspect, the German Army’s internal organization concentrated on combat effectiveness, delegating supporting functions to the rear. Towards that purpose, the German Army was divided into a Field Army, responsible for all military operations, and a Replacement Army, responsible for training, replacements, procurement, and administration. Both branches were organized on the basis of regional defense districts, with the purpose of bringing men, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers together from the same region, thus promoting social homogeneity. Both branches also maintained close connections, through rotation of officers and personnel, frequent visits and close personal ties between officers (Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
As a third aspect, officers and NCOs were primarily selected on the basis of character and trained towards decisive combat leadership. The selection of officers, their admission to officer training and their commission rested with the regimental commanders of the men involved. Only in 1942 a central screening office was instituted for officer testing, but the other decisions remained at the regimental level. Officers were primarily selected on the basis of character and will power, more than intelligence or education. Psychological tests, examinations and personal evaluations played a main role in the selection process. Formal training lasted between 9-16 months, in which tactics and operations were emphasized, while strategy, logistics and organization were relatively neglected. As the war proceeded, active front service increasingly came to be regarded as the best training of aspiring officers, including those NCOs who showed leadership and initiative in front of the enemy. Promotion to higher ranks primarily occurred on the basis of personal evaluations of character, competence and the ability to generate trust under front line conditions, increasingly more than seniority or General Staff training (Dupuy, 1984; Knox, 2000; Van Creveld, 1983).
Although in the course of the war a shortage of officers developed, the German Army in general did not compromise on their quality, preferring competent junior or no officers over incompetent ones. Officers should show responsibility, independent action and quick decision-making, while remaining within the framework of the mission of their senior commanders. They should lead from up front, issuing their own mission orders on the basis of first-hand knowledge of the situation. Unlike most other armies, officers were expected to live with their men and allowed to fraternalize with them when off duty. At the same time they were expected to enforce strict discipline, thus combining attitudes of sternness and benevolence. In general both officers and senior NCOs, at least below battalion level, were highly regarded by their men (Antal, 1993; Frieser, 2005; Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
The selection of NCOs and their admission rested with the company or battery commanders of the men involved, acting on General Staff guidelines. Selection again occurred mainly on the basis of character and will power. Aspiring NCOs received two years of training in special battalions by regimental officers and senior NCOs, leading to a strong “esprit de corps” among them. The avenue to and from of NCO-ship was relatively open, with one in six men being promoted to NCO and many NCOs becoming officers, eleven of them even attaining the rank of general. Due to a shortage of men, however, NCO selection and training requirements had relaxed noticeably by the end of 1944 (Rush, 1999; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
As a fourth aspect, men were selected, trained and organized in ways that bolstered unit cohesion and morale. The selection of recruits occurred in local centers by a selection officer and a physician, while their admission to specific army branches rested with their future regimental commanders. Selection again was based on personal judgments and tests, assessing character more than intelligence. Recruits received their mainly tactical and practical basic training of about 12-21 weeks in the Replacement Army, after which they were transferred to the Field Replacement Battalions (“Feldersatzbattallione”) of their future Field Army division for advanced training (Hart, 2001; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
In the German Army replacements were mainly used to set up new divisions, not to bring existing divisions up to strength. This practice turned divisions into cohesive, tightly knit units with considerable fighting power, until cohesion gains were offset by the depletion of men and officers due to war attrition. Further, this practice made rotation of divisions in and out the line possible to the very end of World War II. Rotation involved a few weeks of refreshment, rearmament, recovery and rest, which were quite important for morale (Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
Replacements reached their divisions in 1,000 men strong, armed and self-sustained marching battalions (“Marschbattallione”), led by officers of the receiving division. Upon arrival, the men and their officers were dispersed over the three companies of a “Feldersatzbattallion”, which were closely tied to the division’s three regiments. Recovered men and officers traveled back to their last field unit in the same “Marschbattallione”, which in this way were instrumental in integrating old and new men and officers. Recovered soldiers, though small in numbers, were particularly welcomed by their units, since these veterans were important for group cohesion and front atmosphere (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983).
Since especially at the Eastern front war attrition often broke up cohesive units in a matter of days, other sources of morale were important as well. Although the influence of Nazi propaganda is often mentioned in this respect, it is estimated that Nazi enthusiasts made up only 10-15 percent of all enlisted men. However, they were more numerous among NCOs and young officers, and much more numerous among Waffen SS and paratroopers. Particularly appealing in Nazi propaganda was the idea of “Volksgemeinschaft”, an ideal that promised a harmonious society without class conflict in which individuals would be integrated in their communities. Further, personal faith in Hitler as a leader was widespread among the troops (Fritz, 1996; Madej, 1978; Messerschmidt, 1983; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
As the war progressed, other forces driving German morale became the increasing realization that the German Homeland was now in danger, the still faint but uneasy realization that the war excesses and crimes committed by German forces, in particularly at the Eastern front, would now backfire on Germany at the hands of the revenging Russians, and the Allied call for unconditional surrender. It led to the sardonic exhortation: “Enjoy the war while you can, because the peace will be terrible” (Kershaw, 1990: 57; Shils and Janowitz, 1948).
As a fifth aspect, the General Staff of the German Army played an important role at the higher levels of command. Established in 1814, it was the Army’s most prestigious and exclusive institution, until late 1942 the only road to preferred promotion and the rank of general. General Staff training was geared towards tactics and operations and combining practical and formal training, relatively neglecting strategy and administration. Again personal character was deemed more important than intelligence, and the tough 18 month training program was intended primarily to test and bolster character. After 1942, however, the influence of staff training on career development waned as Hitler sought to decrease the influence of the General Staff and the Army’s “old guard” in favor of “Volk” officers showing combat talent and accomplishment (Dupuy, 1984; Knox, 2000; Van Creveld, 1983).
In the spirit of Napoleon, the General Staff (and its equivalents at army, corps and division levels) functioned as a small, well-trained, integrated support unit of commanders, emphasizing execution over planning and shunning detailed paperwork that, in the words of Von Moltke, “would not survive the first contact with the enemy”. Staffs were very reluctant to place administrative burdens on the troops in the field, relying on global ten days reports on strength and losses instead of detailed daily reports. Staffs at all echelons remained well-informed and closely connected to one another, though, because officers rotated continuously between the General Staff and senior field command positions (Boothe, 2005; Dupuy, 1984; Hughes, 1986; Van Creveld, 1983).
An important role of the General Staff was the rigorous and objective analysis of victory and defeat on the basis of after action reports (“Erfahrungsberichte”) from lower units. The General Staff as a rule demanded that these “Erfahrungsberichte” be as critical, honest and accurate as possible. In general lower commanders were not afraid to issue reports in this spirit, indicating a high level of trust and honesty between echelons. The General Staff used the results of analysis for the continuous improvement of doctrine and tactics and their translation in training programs, which it developed in close collaboration with the Replacement Army (Hart, 2001; Murray, 1981, 1992).
As a final aspect, the German Army’s personnel administration consistently and ostensibly rewarded good combat performance. Leave was more readily granted to front-line troops, veterans and married men, equitable across ranks. It was systematically used as a reward of brave deeds by men in particular. In such cases it was immediately granted, with an endorsement by the army commander. Decorations were awarded for independent action and bravery, with higher requirements for officers than for men. They were cumulative, rewarding repeated acts of bravery. Decisions on higher decorations were taken by Hitler personally, on recommendation of the direct superior and corps or army commander, often within two to five weeks and surrounded by broad military media coverage. However, military justice was harsh and often draconian, with 11,753 men executed for desertion and undermining morale, which probably led to relatively low desertion rates. Men were as well protected against their officers as the other way round. The harsh system was given a “human face” by the veterans and by relative lenience on private transgressions, like drunkenness and women in the barracks (Kershaw, 1990; Shils and Janowitz, 1948; Van Creveld, 1983; Wilson, 1989).
In comparison to the German Army, the US Army in World War II grew rapidly, and for that reason had to be centrally organized. In its internal organization it adhered to principles of scientific management. Its command and control systems relied on large amounts of detailed information, collected by large staff units and applied in detailed orders from the higher echelons downward (“Befehlstaktik”, with General Patton as a notable exception). The US Army strove for an optimal and efficient distribution of men and material, dispersing men and officers randomly over its divisions without considerations of unit cohesion or morale. Officers were primarily selected on the basis of intelligence and rewarded for information procuring and processing, much to the detriment of leadership at the front. Instead of fighting power, the US Army relied on numerical superiority in technology and equipment to overwhelm its enemies (Dunivan, 2003; Leonhard, 1993; Hart, 2001; Van Creveld, 1983).
Further, in comparison to the German Army, the British Army in World War II was characterized by a considerable degree of decentralization, with the regiments as foci of organization, identification and communication. This characteristic hampered the adoption of army wide doctrine and the formation, development and training of coherent fighting units above regimental level, such as brigade and division. Further, continuity and cohesion suffered from regimentally-induced wholesale replacements of battalions inside divisions, from the rotation of battalions between the Home Command and field commands, and from frequent leadership changes at senior levels. The latter problem, combined with the lack of army wide doctrine, led to radically different operational styles, meaning that divisions and higher had to learn a new way of waging war with each new commander (French, 2001; Hart, 2001; Heginbotham, 2000; Mutch, 2006).

Battlefield performance

The differences in degrees of configuration towards fighting power between the German Army on the one hand and the US and British Armies on the other seem to be related to battlefield performance. When looking at actual battle engagements between German and Allied forces during World War II, it may be argued that the Germans rather clearly prevailed in most of them. Quantitative evidence comes from Dupuy (1984, 1986), who has developed a model for battle engagements with two measures, combat effectiveness and score effectiveness.
The first measure, Combat Effectiveness Value, is concerned with the ratio of relative combat outcomes and combat power. In a formula it is defined as: CEV = (Rg/Ra)(Pg/Pa), whereby CEVg = 1/CEVa. In this formula P represents Combat Power, which in its turn is defined as: P = S x V. Here S represents Force Strength (sum of operational lethality indexes for the weapons inventories of each side, modified for the effects of weather, terrain and season), and V represents Variables affecting the employment of the force under the circumstances existing as the time of the engagement (most importantly posture, terrain, weather, mobility, and vulnerability). Calculating P values for the German and Allied sides in the engagements results in Pg/Pa ratios. Further, in the CEV formula R represents Result, the actual outcomes of engagements defined by three sub measures (mission accomplishment, spatial effectiveness, and casualty effectiveness). Calculating R values for the German and Allied sides in the engagements results in Rg/Ra ratios.
Applying the CEV formula to 81 engagements between German and Allied forces in Southern and North Western Europe between 1943-1944, Dupuy discovered that the German R/R values were usually higher than their P/P values and the reverse for the Allies. In all 81 engagements the German CEV usually was between 1.1 and 1.3, the Allied CEV between 0.7 and 0.9. The actual outcomes of these engagements could thus only be predicted with the equations “when it was assumed that, man for man and unit for unit, the Germans were 20-30 % more effective than the British and American forces facing them” (Dupuy, 1984: 253).
Further, applying the same analysis to 14 engagements at the Eastern front showed a German CEV of about 3.0 (1941) to 2.5 (1943) to 1.8 (1944). This indicates that in 1941 German combat effectiveness superiority over the Russians was close to 200 %, meaning that on the average one German division was a match for at least three Russian divisions of comparable size and firepower. In 1944, when the course of war had turned decisively in favor of the Russian forces, this superiority was still nearly 100 % (Dupuy, 1984; 1986).
The second measure, Score Effectiveness, is not concerned with outcomes and weapons. Instead it counts the number of men and the number of casualties (killed, wounded, missing) on both sides of an engagement, from which a score is calculated, i.e. the average number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by blocks of 100 men on each side. The Score Effectiveness is calculated by dividing the score by a constant, the value of which depends on posture (1 for attack, 1.2 for delaying resistance, 1.3 for hasty defense, 1.5 for prepared defense, and 1.6 for fortified defense) (Dupuy, 1984, 1986).
When in all 81 engagements at the Western front the German Score Effectiveness was divided by the Allied one a differential of 1 : 1.52 was obtained. This differential held for Germans attacking or defending, for Germans fighting with numerical superiority or inferiority, for Germans fighting British or American troops, for Germans winning or losing. Dupuy (1984: 253) concluded: “On a man for man basis the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 % higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances.”
At the Eastern front in 1941 the average German frontline soldier inflicted 7.78 Russian casualties for each German lost, but this differential plummeted in the course of the campaign. Still, in 1944 the Germans on a man-for-man basis inflicted about 300 % more casualties than they incurred from the opposing Russians. Further, a calculation of Score Effectiveness in the Polish campaign (1939) indicated a German casualty-inflicting superiority of nearly 4 to 1, indicating a German combat effectiveness superiority of close to 2 to 1 (Dupuy, 1984; 1986).

Discussion and conclusions

In this paper the notion of organizational Gestalt or configuration has been conceptually developed and refined and related to battlefield performance, in an extension of performance indicators normally used in the literature. It has been argued that the German Army in World War II to a comparatively high degree was configured towards fighting power. Its philosophy of war acknowledged the existence of environmental uncertainty and turbulence and emphasized the need for a decentralized approach to adapt to it. Its internal organization concentrated on combat effectiveness and delegated supporting functions to the rear. It selected its officers and NCOs primarily on the basis of character and trained them towards decisive combat leadership. It selected, trained and organized its men in ways that bolstered unit cohesion and morale. Its General Staff played an important role at the higher levels of command. Its system of personnel administration consistently and ostensibly rewarded good combat performance.
When compared to the German Army in terms of the theoretical framework of this paper, the US Army may be regarded as a functional whole or system, in which the parts were as efficiently as possible organized into the organizational whole. However, the US Army’s organizational elements seemed less configured toward fighting power as a single principle than those of the German Army, which often sacrificed organizational efficiency for combat effectiveness. By identical comparison, the British Army may be regarded as an aggregate whole, in which the regiments constituted fairly independent elements. Within the regiments elements were more closely configured towards fighting power, but the lack of an army-wide “Gestaltung” of elements made the British Army vulnerable in large-scale battle engagements, as Dupuy’s equations attest.
Current organizations that strive for high internal configuration and good performance can definitely learn from German army organization and personnel management. This holds for army organizations, some of which already have attempted to incorporate German doctrine and principles, especially the doctrine of mission tactics (“Auftragstaktik”), be it with varying degrees of success (e.g., Boothe, 2005; Leonhard, 1993; Vogelaar and Kramer, 2004).1 This also holds for civilian organizations that more or less share army features, like prisons, correctional facilities, police forces, hospitals, mental institutions and fire departments. These organizations regularly deal with emotionally intense life-death emergency situations, they acknowledge the necessity of strong unit cohesion and clear leadership in such emergencies, and they are all more or less characterized by a inclusive atmosphere (Visser, 2007a).

Comments By Veteran7
This study left out a number of important influences that had a profound influence on the Wehrmacht.:
(1)Hitler was hated for covert reasons the reader will not find described in any book published by the US military or mainline US publishers. Hitler was the first, and last (since Napoleon), leader of a European nation that came from the working or lower middle classes. His genius was not fettered by European class distinctions or his lack of a college degree. The upper classes, to include the very rich and families of the feudal nobility, have controlled Europe for over a thousand years. That feudal power has never been destroyed for all time. Even now the European Union is nothing more than a feudal empire of strongly controlled duchies or nation states run by the same type of feudal arrangement developed before the middle ages. Hitler was hated, and is still hated by the so-called rich nobility of Europe as an “upstart commoner,” “a little corporal.” Hitler was a white man of common origins and not one of the feudalists’ favored minorities, which further exacerbated their hatred. Feudalist realize that it is from the white working and lower middle classes that the greatest threats to feudal hegemony will always arise.
That feudal hatred was most pronounced among the rich Jews and the communists both of which readily adapted to feudalism. The barrage of anti-Hitler hatred continues today, over five decades past the end of the Third Reich, such is the power that the feudalists still hold on world opinion, especially in the feudal Marxist-Capitalist states of America and Canada.
(2) Hitler actually represented the people of Germany and strove to improve their lot in life, both nationally and individually. Actual representation of the best interests of the majority, infuriates feudalists because they never represent anyone’s best interests except their own and the interests of their favored minority vassals. The leaders of Europe were, and are corrupt, and Hitler is still hated for his lack of domestic corruption.
(3) Hitler proclaimed that any German citizen, man or woman, with enough intelligence and drive, could become an officer or leader in Germany. That very statement went against every fiber of control and corruption valued by the western nations where only the upper classes or college graduates, imbued with a leftist-Marxist ideology, may become leaders.
(4) The power of international Jewry was so influential in Europe, America and Britain that their hatred of Hitler has been continuously broadcast for decades by every controlled media and educational unit. The center of gravity of that continuous barrage of hatred against Hitler was the depiction of Hitler as a “Jew killer.” That theme of Hitler-hatred, has as its centerpiece, the holocaust. The strength of resistance to the truth of the holocaust, and research refuting its every claim, has been considered so dangerous by the west that Germany and other nations now jail anyone who speaks against the holocaust religion.
(5) Such profound hatred of Hitler and the fact that both Britain and the USSR had insinuated deep penetration agents within the German General staff and High Command is what really doomed Hitler. A massive conspiracy of silence has disallowed the truth, about the true nature and activities of anti-Hitler conspirators inside the German Army, to ever be known. A drumfire of lies has constantly depicted Germany’s treasonous army officers as “heroes.” This propaganda has gone on for the past seventy-five years.
This year the latest major propaganda effort in that direction will be broadcast as a movie entitled Valkyrie, starring Tom Cruise, a member of a leftist religious cult. The movie Valkyrie tells again the lie that the German officers who plotted against Germany were really trying to help Germany by killing Hitler. In fact, the real story has been emerging for the past decade. German traitor including a number of generals and General Staff officers, sabotaged the German war effort since 1935 with a plethora of treasonous and operational sabotage efforts. Their sabotage caused the deaths of millions of German soldiers and Germany’s military defeat. Only now are the details of their evil machinations beginning to be revealed. The plotters had a mixed bag of motivations, none of which served the interests of the German people. Some wanted "anybody but a commoner"to run Germany, some wanted a return to monarchy, most of the conspirators wanted Russia's Marxism to control, and some served Britain's Marxist-Capitalism. They all shared a certain cowardice and a ruthless desire to cause the deaths of millions of Germans so that Germany would lose the war.
The above controversial musings may discomfort some people who only believe what the media tells them. I ask that you spend more than a decade researching the above historical events, as I have, and then draw your own conclusions, that is, unless your mind has been made up for you.

Light Machine Gun

Light Machine Gun Employment


Along the skirmish line, when in direct contact with the enemy, one or two light machine guns for every 9 or 10 man squad is absolutely essential. Without light machine guns, squads will not last long. Be happy when you encounter those American, Cauckistan and Brit units whose commanders eschew light machine guns and prefer BAR type weapons.

When a firefight erupts it usually escalates as combat elements make contact with each other along the battle line. In the woods, jungle, hills or step, usually fire teams start fighting and more units are committed to the battle as the commander makes his decisions. Of course there are exceptions to this rule.

If a unit is crossing an open area and comes under fire they will have to adjust. A firefight can quickly escalate from an individual firing at the enemy to a battalion, or regiment firing at the enemy in an encounter battle.

When a squad makes contact with the enemy the squad leader has to make several quick decisions. This decisions are based on the mission, the squad's capabilities and his sense of the build up of enemy firepower. He must evaluate what kind of force the squad is facing. Sometimes this can be determined by the how many enemy rifles are being heard and how much of an area those weapons are occupying.

A lot depends on the situation. If the squad has been ambushed and has taken casualties and the squad leader can't extract safely, he might order a desperate attack. What kind of attack varies on the terrain and situation. Most likely he will order a fireteam (A fireteam is an element of a squad. Ideally a squad should include two fireteams with each 4-man team having a light machine gun and an RPG. The fire team includes a fifth man also, either the squad leader or the assistant squad leader.

If a squad leader allows one of his fire teams to move off independently, he will soon lose control of it. Both fire teams should be kept with a squad. It is not big enough to maneuver independently.) to try and flank the enemy, or he might bring up the other fire team to help suppress the enemy.

The Squad Leader has three primary objectives that over rule all others:
1. Destroy the enemy
2. Scout the enemy
3. Preserve as man of his men as possible from being killed, wounded or missing.
With those three injunction in mind , a squad leader must think twice before sacrificing more of his unit in an attempt to rescue wounded.

A squad leader, attacking as a point unit of a larger formation, must do two things upon enemy contact:
1. Feel them out, try to determine the size of the enemy
2. Pin them if possible

After the above two tasks are attempted, the squad leader reports the situation to the platoon leader. If enemy pressure is too great, he executes a fighting withdrawal on his own initiative. He must not allow his squad to be over run while conducting any rescue attempt.

Of course the squad leader might order everyone to run for their life. As explained above fire teams are not independent units and have minimal firepower compared to a rifle platoon, company or battalion.

In fact, it is stupid for a company or platoon to attempt to, or allow, a squad leader to maneuver his squad separately. Squads are not maneuver elements.In fact the basic maneuver element should be a battalion. Fighting piecemeal when larger units can both flank and over run small enemy units is the mark of an amateur.

Of course all battalion and company commanders should be up front with their troops. The battalion commander who stays in the rear with the gear, guarded by two companies while one company "maneuvers" is an inadequate combat leader.
Up front is where the war is and the glory is.

Back to the Squad Leader
It is the squad leader's mission to deploy his fire teams in an effective manner against the enemy. With all the yelling, screaming, gunfire and confusion, a squad leader has a very difficult job controlling his squad and maneuvering it effectively. A squad leader can't always see his entire squad, or even his team leaders.
Squad radios are useful to a squad leader but he should know how to receive reports and give orders without them.
If the squad doesn't have radios the squad leader has to use hand and arm signals. In this situation he must keep the squad together in a skirmish line. It is the responsibility of the squad members to know where the leader is.
The squad leader must always keep priority control of his light machine guns and directly give them firing orders.Usually yelling is of limited value because of all the noise and hand arm signals down work very well unless people are looking at him or it is night time.
What ends up happening in American units is that the squad leader has to run around from team leader to team leader screaming out directions or receiving reports. Of course yelling sometimes works, but not always. That is the wrong way.
A well trained squad will automatically execute a counter fire drill upon entering an unplanned encounter battle. The squad leader may send a runner to alert the other team leader with an order if he is out of sight. One team is always with the squad leader. The squad leader can also use a whistle to communicate with his other fire team or flare gun to communicate with his platoon leader.
That is why standard operating procedures are so important to a squad. SOP's cover most situations and help overcome much of the confusion. For example, if the SOP calls for first fire team to lay down a base of fire when they make contact and for second fire team to envelope (flank) then that is wrong.
Both fireteams will remain under squad leader control when contact is first made.Overall, the squad leaders has a great deal of control and can spell the difference between victory or defeat if his squad is properly trained.

Some squads are organized around medium machine guns. For instance, not so long ago British squads were organized with eight men. One had a medium machine gun and the other seven had regular assault rifles. When the firing began, the machine gunner and his assistant would lay down a base of fire while the six riflemen advanced. When the squad leader was ready for the machine gun to advance, all six riflemen would fire to cover the gunner's advance. That method failed because the squad leader always split his squad before he had too and his rifle unit was invariably wiped out.

Regardless of organization, a poorly trained (or led) squad would operate as one big mob directed by the squad leader. The squad might have a great deal of firepower in the form of machine guns and rockets, but there would often be a lack of initiative among the troops.The Soviets were a prime example of this. The tactics were difficult but the reds knew that wars are won at the operational level, not the tactical level.
All Soviet tactics were based on battle drills or standard operating procedures. The advantage of this method was that everyone knew what was going on and what was expected of them. Only squad leaders knew how to read a map or a radio. If something unexpected happened then the battle drill could rapidly fall apart.
To overcome that probldm, the Soviets used waves. When wave one fell apart, then wave two would move in, or wave three. Eventually, one wave would succeed and the waves that failed could regroup and reorganize. This method of combat was great for the Soviets who relied on quantity over quality. They won World War II with such tactics.
Maxim 1: The point is, a squad is nothing without one or two light machine guns.
Maxim 2: Battles are won by concentrations of power.

Those leaders who worry about : the embedded press, ROE commissars, collateral damage and suffering casualties will inevitably end up defending base camps and relinquish the initiative.Lower level Soviet soldiers were not encouraged to think or act on their own. In a Soviet type military, the squad leader would be nothing more than a fireteam leader with a lot more men and weapons than usual. The platoon commander, an officer, would be the real decision maker and even then he would always defer to a higher authority. That is because squads and platoons are too small to have a real effect on combat. A rifle company has a limited effect, but a rifle battalion, with the commander up front and no “staff” will make a significant contribution.A Soviet style squad is heavily armed with automatic weapons. Usual doctrine calls for the squad to deploy on line and while standing or crouching, advance on the enemy. As the squad advances a high volume of fire would be maintained so that the squad would have fire superiority and their enemy would be forced to seek cover. With fire superiority, the Soviet squad would advance on line with their weapon in their shoulder or at their hip. When a soldier fired he would 'walk' his rounds into the target, adjusting his aim according to where his rounds hit. Of course the Soviets did not always do it this way. They would take cover and use finer tactics, but they preferred to keep things as simple as possible and trained their troops accordingly. Most of their soldiers were conscripts and didn't want to be there anyway. This is also another reason, nearly all Soviet weapons had the automatic fire capability.

American ground units are micro-managed from higher levels than the Soviet or Russian army has ever been. The American army has frequently had a colonel or general maneuvering a platoon or company. Why? Americans have too many radios. They only give lip service to initiative and the offensive. The truth is that American higher commanders are very timid, greatly fear any casualties and micromanage their troops relentlessly. They depend on artillery and air power to smother the enemy. The US Army only pretends to value initiative. It is more micromanaged than any Soviet unit ever was.
Machine Guns
In most cases a machine gun can be reloaded by an assistant gunner who can attach the next belt to the one currently in the gun. However, if the machine gun does run out, the top 'feed cover' has to be lifted, a new belt placed in the mechanism and the feed tray closed. Then the charging handle has to be pulled to the rear before the gunner can fire.
However a machine gunner must be able to operate his gun alone. In a fire fight, the squad machine gun(s) should be the last part of the squad that is killed, not the first part.

Some machine guns (especially newer ones) have a kind of magazine that is often little more than a box of linked ammo that is attached underneath the weapon. This box can be replaced relatively easily but the belt of ammo still has to be fed into the weapon.

Counting ammo fired from a machine gun while under fire is not practical so the gunner must frequently check to see how much he has left . He could place a certain number of tracer rounds at the end of a belt but remember, tracer rounds give the machine gun position away. The belt of ammo might also snag on branches or other things and trip up the gunner.

Formations
A squad only uses dedicated formations when it is moving to the attack. During patrols it may use formations but due to the fact patrols usually cover large amounts of area formations are not always practical except in certain situations. The squad uses many of the same formations as a fireteam, with one additional one. Inside the squad formation, the fireteams are in their own formations. Sometimes the squad leader dictates which formations the fireteams will use but not always. For instance in a squad wedge, the lead fireteam might be in a fireteam wedge and the fireteams on either side might be in echelons.Grenades, and RPGs are used as needed. Underslung grenade launchers should be kept loaded and reloaded after they are fired. Grenades launched from the muzzle should be loaded only when required.Carry too much ammo and you are going to be a nice slow moving target. Carry too little ammo and you might be a fast moving target. Remember the ammo has to go somewhere and the weight adds up fast. Ammunition isn't made of feathers, it is made of steel, brass and lead. Magazines are also made of metal. Magazine pouches should be located on the sides where they don't interfere with the soldier when he tries to become one with the ground while bullets zip by overhead.

Patrol
A squad is organized very well for a patrol. It does not have enough organic firepower to hold its own in a big fight . It is small enough to move with some degree of stealth and security.
The Defense
A squad in the defense is just one part of a larger force. A squad leader, as directed and assisted by the platoon leader is assigned a specific area to cover. In turn, the squad leader assigns his assistant squad leader specific areas to cover and they assign individuals, specific areas.
The squad leader makes sure the machine guns are properly placed and can fire across the squad's front. The squad leader also insures all areas of the squad's front are covered by one or more weapons.
Covering fire has four uses.
1. Suppress the enemy. This means discourage the enemy from firing accurately. It takes time to acquire a target and aim and if bullets are hitting near him, he might not be willing to take that time. Accurate fire is what wins a fight, that is why Marines, Rangers, and other elite units consider marksmanship so important.
2. Prevent the enemy from firing. This is the ultimate goal of covering fire. If the enemy is so intimidated by your fire then you can move about with relative safety. You an stroll up and toss a grenade in his hole if he is so intimidated.
3. Force the enemy to move in a certain way. Shooting under a car is going to encourage the enemy to move to better cover where his feet won't get shot off. By forcing your enemy to move to a different piece of cover you might get in a lucky shot and down your foe or you might force him to retreat to a position that is more exposed.
4. Confuse or distract the enemy from your activities and movement. If the enemy is too busy cowering from your volley of fire he is not likely to notice your friend(s) moving off to the side where he can get a better shot. Distracting the enemy with covering fire may give you more time to aim or get closer.
COVERING FIRE:
This is when machine guns are most useful. Their high volume of fire and high degree of intimidation is a great way to scare the opposition into taking cover and staying there. In the attack this is incredibly important because it allows other attackers to get into position where they can do the most damage to the enemy.
A high number of tracers in the ammo mix can magnify the intimidation of the machine gun but using more tracers should be considered carefully because tracers can be backtracked to their source.
Light Machine guns are likely to travel with the assault group, heavier machine guns are best deployed where they can shoot over the heads of the assault group or from the side where they will not endanger the assault group.
Colored smoke or flares are the best method of telling the supporting machine guns to cease fire because they might not be able to tell when friendly forces are too close.
Patrol:
On patrol machine guns should be deployed in a location where they are best protected from an enemy. Machine gunners do not walk point for this reason. When the shooting starts Machine guns should be able to deploy to the best position possible instead of being pinned down in the initial volley of enemy fire.When deployed they should be placed where they can do the most damage to the enemy.
Defense:
Machine guns are the backbone of the defense. They can set up a wall of fire that the enemy dare not cross. Two machine guns working together can fire across each others front and creating an X. This 'X' is one way of creating a wall of fire and preventing the enemy from over running the defensive position. This is called "Final Protective Fires" and is done only when the signal is given.
When the enemy begins the attack, machine gunners are directed to engage groups of enemy troops. They try to break the enemy's attack. Machine guns should not be the first weapons to open fire. Riflemen should start firing first. This helps conceal the locations of the machine guns because the enemy may see the initial muzzle flash from a rifleman's weapon, but by the time the machine guns open up the enemy is (hopefully) busy taking cover and doesn't have the time to look for the machine guns amid all the other weapons firing at him.
One problem with machine guns in the defense is their vulnerability. As I said earlier machine guns are the backbone of the defense and the offense.
The enemy would think nothing of using any weapon to take out the machine guns. When the machine guns are destroyed then the organized defense can crumble more easily because it becomes a battle of stationary riflemen against moving machine guns, rocket launchers and riflemen. There is a term for a stationary rifleman - sitting duck.

In the defense machine guns get the best locations, heavy MG's taking priority over lighter MG's. Riflemen fill in the gaps between machine guns.Machine guns are also deployed where they can shoot the farthest and across open ground. This allows the use of "Grazing fire" meaning the bullets travel above the ground between one and four feet high for as far as possible.
Grenade launchers are designated to cover those (dead ground) areas a machine gun cannot because they can fire indirectly.

When things become desperate for the defenders the signal is given for "Final Protective Fires" and the machine guns rotate to shoot across the front of friendly forces and create a 'Wall of fire'. This wall of lead is called a FPL or Final Protective Line and is designated before the fight begins. Stakes may be used to help the machine gunner aim correctly at night or in smoke.
Effects:
Machine guns are more likely to use special rounds such as tracers and armor piercing rounds.
Some machine guns can fire more powerful rounds because of the heavier barrels. A US M2 fifty caliber machine gun can fire at ranges over two miles. Heavy machine guns can also be fired single shot if the trigger is pressed quick enough. Carlos Hathcock used a fifty cal MG with a scope mounted on it to kill a VC at close to two miles away. The weapon fired single shots and was not employed as an automatic weapon.
Night Fire:
The sound and the muzzle flash are a dead giveaway for the Machine gun's position. Firing ten bullets means creating ten muzzle flashes and a muzzle flash is one of the best ways of locating the enemy. Light machines are the squads best weapon because they can be easily moved.
Some machine guns are not very mobile as a result they could become a prime target.
Many machine guns are equipped with nightscopes because it gives them a small edge. Currently nightscopes are awkward to mount and the muzzle flash can interfere with them but they are better than nothing.Manning: Machine guns are always manned meaning there is always someone at the machine gun and ready to use it in a combat zone. If the Machine gunner has to urinate, dig a hole, get out his sleeping bag, ect, the assistant machine gunner gets behind the weapon.
Anti-tank:
Machine guns are an important part of armor-kill teams. Against a heavily armored tank machine guns are basically useless right? -Wrong!When a tank crew is buttoned up inside their tank their visibility is severely limited. A tank crew inside their tank cannot see anti-tank missiles or rockets fired until it is too late in most cases. To prevent getting ambushed and to see their surroundings more clearly, tank crews stick their heads or whole bodies up out of the hatch. This allows them to see a missile launched at them and they can take evasive action.Furthermore, tanks are usually very vulnerable without infantry to protect them, especially in cities or rough terrain. (That is why infantry must separate enemy infantry from their tanks.)
When an armor-kill team ambushes a group of tanks, the machine guns fire first. This encourages the tank crews to button up and hide inside their tanks to avoid getting shot. This is when the RPG missile fires. It takes time for the crew to button up and by the time they are ready to fight back the missile has been launched and soon hits them.
Terms
Grazing Fire: an area one to four feet high across an open area. Machine guns are deployed to maximize grazing fire.
Final Protective Fires: A term used to denote when machine guns should resort to their FPL's. The command to fire FPF's is usually given when the enemy is about to over run all or part of the perimeter. Machine guns fire as fast as they can in order to create a wall of lead across the unit's front.
Final Protective Line: a direction for the machine gun to point that allows it to shoot across the unit's front and interlock with other machine guns. This allows the MG's to create a "Wall of lead".
Beaten Zone: This is an area where the bullets from a machine gun land.Trajectory: This is the path of a bullet. Bullets do not travel in a straight line because of gravity, they travel in an arc. The further the range the steeper the curvature.
Cone of Fire: This cone incorporates the area between the muzzle and the beaten zone. When a burst is fired they do not all follow the same path, they diverge a little bit to cover more area. Even if the weapon is locked in a certain position, not all the rounds will hit the same point. Atmospheric, recoil and variations in the ammunition create variation.
Plunging Fire: This is defined as an area where it is dangerous for a person to be. Plunging fire is obtained when firing from hill top to hill top, down into an area or up onto a hill. To protect against plunging fire defenders need overhead cover which is not always available.
Traverse and Elevation: Because Medium and heavy machine guns are most effective when fired from a mount (tripod or vehicle) there are certain aspects that affect the accuracy and abilities of the weapon. These larger machine guns have a mechanism located under the gun that fixes it into a certain position. This mechanism called a T & E (Traverse and Elevation) is used to provide fine control over accuracy. The T&E usually has two knobs, one controls horizontal control, the other controls vertical control. This allows the gunner to fine tune his accuracy. Without a T&E any adjustment by the gunner (like to move his elbow to a more comfortable position) can have a massive impact on the accuracy.By using the T&E a machine gun is a very accurate, very deadly weapon.
Frontal Fire: This is when the gunner is facing the enemy. This is not what machine gunners like to think about because the enemy is usually shooting back.
Flanking Fire: This is when the gunner is shooting at the side of the enemy. In this case the enemy is not facing (and shooting at?) the gunner.
Oblique Fire: This is when the gunner is shooting at an angle relevant to the long axis of the target.
Enfilade Fire: This is what machine gunners have wet dreams about. The long axis of the enemy is lined up for the gunner so that in theory, one bullet could kill them all. The enemy may be facing the gunner (Frontal Enfilade Fire) or facing away from the gunner (Flanking Enfilade Fire).
Indirect Fire: Machine guns can be used for indirect fire too. Only highly trained crews can be effective with it however.
Machine Gun Squads
In some cases two or more teams of machine guns (a Machine Gun Squad usually has two machine gun teams of three or four men each) may be deployed as a squad. This can get messy for the enemy because of the concentrated firepower.
Many machine gun combat methods and organizations are described at www.quikmaneuvers.com.In many cases machine gun teams are deployed separately but sometimes machine gun teams are deployed as a squad.
In garrison machine gun squads usually live and train together and are assigned to the Weapons platoon. When the unit goes to the field they are deployed as the company commander sees fit. By billeting the machine gunners together it helps standardize training and logistics in garrison.
Light machine guns, not automatic rifles, should be permanent elements of rifle squads.

Wars are won by light machine guns, not high tech gimmickry.

Military Intuition and Military Analysis

Military Intuition and Military Analysis

Nearly all American books on war are linear. They describe facts in a progression, over time. All actors in their stories of history are also described as emitting described behaviors, linearally. The military expert, military intellectual or military professional, is neither understood nor described by such writers. Nearly all American military writers or "historians,"are not military experts, but researchers, who in the main, have no military frame of reference. In fact many of them seek to convey only their anti-military bias superimposed on the superstructure of the subject at hand. Most military writers and "historians" are analytical, not intutive. Intuition is expert knowledge gained by experience and continuous study.The military expert is intutive, which I will describe in later posts. The military bureacrat is a creature of analysis. Analysis is linear thinging and is the amateur's approach to problem solving. It is plodding, slow and the results are frequently mediocre when a general's thinking is guided by such a checklist mind set. Intuitive experts move far more rapidly and perceive reality as patterns underpinned by frames of reference. A frame of reference is a blueprint for correctly looking at a subject which clarifies the relative importance of competing variables.There are two basic methods of military decision making, analysis and intuition, or coup d' oeil. According to British Colonel Charles Rogers, western military officers are frequently paralyzed by analysis. "...On the one hand, we have decisions based on an exhaustive analysis of factors. On the other hand, we have intuition, which emphasizes decisions based on the ability of a commander to rapidly process information gained from knowledge and experience. With technology providing an endless flow of information on the modern battlefield, it would be logical to suggest that analysis would be the stronger form of decision-making. However, the demand for 'certainty' on the battlefield leads to a demand for more information, much of which will be incorrect and misleading. The danger with this process is that commanders believe they never have sufficient information to make a decision, and so they either delay their decision or reach a situation where they never make a decision...this is a state of 'paralysis by analysis' that is a common failing of leaders who have not learned to be decisive..."

Clausewitz's Center of Gravity

Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity

Clausewitz realized that wars are won by rivers of blood and cities on fire. They are not won by Rules of Engagement, Laws of War, civilian trialds of enemy mass murderers and paying tribute.A professional soldier who knows the major concepts of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as well as the German Army concept of Schwehrpunkt (and can apply certain other warfighting principles), can always beat a high tech, US type Army at all three levels of war. There must be one final characteristic too, hardness, the hard ruthlessness grounding a determination to do anything it takes to win , espercially including instilling terror in the enemy. A true professional realize that wars are never over until every enemy politruk, commissar and mullah is liquidated.Over 165 years ago, in 1832, Karl von Clausewitz's book, On War, was published posthumously. Since then, that book has strongly influenced the major military traditions of the modern era. However, to study Clausewitz is useless unless one also studies Napoleon. In fact, Clausewitz's contribution to military art and science was heavily influenced by Napoleon and the Napoleonic era of warfighting.Clausewitz has been held in suspicion only by those nations with the world's best armies, Germany in World War II and the USSR since then.
Invariably, Clausewitz's work has been misinterpreted by all western armies, save Germany. Only a few military experts have understood much of what the Prussian military philosopher had to say.B. H. Liddell Hart gave an excellent description of Clausewitz's contribution to strategic thought. "...Clausewitz blurred the outlines of his philosophy, already indistinct, and made in into a mere marching refrain--A Prussian Marseilles which inflamed the blood and intoxicated the mind. In transfusion it became a doctrine fit to form corporals, not generals. For by making battle appear the only 'real war-like activity', his gospel deprived strategy of its laurels, and reduced the art of war to the mechanics of mass-slaughter. Moreover, it incited generals to seek battle at the first opportunity, instead of creating an advantageous opportunity..."Clausewitz wrote, "...Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skillful method of disarming the enemy without great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art of War...That is an error which must be extirpated..." That classic Clausewitzian phrase would, "...henceforth be used by countless blunderers to excuse, and even to justify, their futile squandering of life in bull-headed assaults...The danger was increased because of the way he constantly dwelt on the decisive importance of a numerical superiority... Even worse was the effect of his theoretical exposition, and exaltation of the idea of 'absolute warfare'--in proclaiming that the road to success was through the unlimited application of force...led to the contradictory end of making policy the slave of strategy...is policy of force without limit and without calculation of costs fits, and is only fit for, a hate-maddened mob. It is the negation of statesmanship and of intelligent strategy..." Clausewitz's demand for bloody battles of annihilation encourages and nurtures the attrition blood sport. Such thinking has crippled US ground forces, the military ground forces of the non-German West, and every army that they have influenced, for over ninety years.
Yet, Clausewitz offered many concepts which facilitated the understanding of strategy. If those concepts are taken en toto, without marrying them to the Clausewitzian bloody battle concept, or the equally unreasonable Clausewitzian disdains for combat intelligence and deception, those unconnected concepts can help unlock some of the mysteries of strategy. It should be remembered however, that many Clausewitzian concepts related to strategic application are contradicted within Clausewitz's own works. Such contradictions may have been caused by errors in translation, errors in Clausewitz's thinking, and evolutionary changes in his thinking which his unfinished and uneditorialized On War manuscript could not reflect because of his untimely death by cholera. Whatever the reason, some such errors can be explained away, others cannot.
Clausewitz's Concept of the Center of Gravity Clausewitz's strategic concept of the center of gravity is contradicted within his own works. In Book VI of On War his definition of the center of gravity reveals a disappointingly attritionist dogmatism. "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity." He further defined the center of gravity as the enemy main army and comparatively discounts the value of attacking enemy lines of communication. Such thinking absolutely and unswervingly leads to the ruinous thinking which dominated elephantine French and American armies that were bled white during each of their Vietnam Wars. Those armies directly sought an ever-illusory, set-piece battle with the enemy's main force, or center of gravity. They sought to mass against that illusory enemy mass at a point where they hoped to pound the opposition to dust in the fires of Armageddon.
Clausewitz is redeemed in Chapter 4, Book Eight of On War. There, he develops a contradictory definition of the center of gravity which is useful to strategic art. In that section of his book, Clausewitz posits that an army may be only one of several centers of gravity. He cites other possible candidates: "...the capital. In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of the protector. Among alliances...the community of interest, ...in popular uprisings...the personalities of the leaders and public opinion..." He then hints that still other centers of gravity may exist by emphasizing the importance of throwing the enemy off balance. By stretching Clausewitz in a rational direction, the center of gravity concept becomes a valuable tool. Thus a center of gravity becomes a place of value to the enemy where he must fight or forfeit part of his strength. By looking at the center of gravity from this angle, a strategist suddenly has a set of designated targets, of varying value to the enemy, which become part of his strategic maneuver potential. Identified enemy vulnerabilities may become decisive aspects of a campaign or series of campaigns that choose battle or the avoidance of battle in maneuvers, which threaten those vulnerabilities.In modern warfare, the Germans have utilized their Schwerpunkt, a modification of Clausewitz's center of gravity, to organize their maneuver. The Germans designate one of their units as the Schwerpunkt, which means that the designated unit will receive all possible support to accomplish its mission. However, the German Schwerpunkt frequently shifts to other units because the Schwerpunkt unit is also the unit which is best exploiting the most important gap or weakness in the enemy array. To the Germans, it is the point of main effort, either in the defense or offense. This concept is also valuable for an organization of strategy, but it is not the same as a center of gravity.Excerpted from, Center of Gravity, By Breaker Mccoy, www.quikmaneuvers.com

Is Your Hobby Sports or War?

Is Your Hobby Sports or War?

Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederic. ... This is the only way to become a great general and master the secrets of the art of war.--Napoleon Bonaparte

Is Your Hobby Sports or War?

Most people would laugh at that question and then start talking about the favorite sports team that they love to watch. Many memorize the statistics about different teams and are face-painted fanatics about it. Some men and women are, in a way, soulless. They have no ideology, or strong political belief system, beyond sports. As long as they can watch over-paid mercenary athletes playing some sport, they don’t care about the immorality or stupidity of investing so much time and money in the fruitless obsession with something that is meaningless.

A general-in-chief should ask himself several times in the day, 'What if the enemy were to appear now in my front, or on my right, or my left?" -Napoleon

War must be made as intense and awful as possible in order to make it short, and thus to diminish its horrors. Yes, sports are meaningless, they will never influence the future of our families, ourselves, our nation or impinge upon the preservation of our freedom. They are simply the bread and circuses of Roman times, brought forward to divert today’s hyperactive, prescription-drugged masses towards focusing upon highly paid voyeurism. Glory is fleeting, but obscurity is forever.Bloodletting is among the ingredients of political medicine.

Americans are taught from the first grade to be sports voyeurs, to watch “their superiors” play a sport and to care about it. Later such training causes adults to fork over a lot of money to watch other men and women play.

This author realized the irony of such behavior as he came up in football, playing high school and college ball, while wondering why so many people seemed to care one way or another, as they got drunk and screamed for their favorite team.
In war you see your own troubles; those of the enemy you cannot see. You must show confidence.There is another hobby that will fortify a man in good times or bad. It is meaningful, inexpensive and provides a path towards self actualization.

Napoleon once said: “Waiting in the shadows, throughout the world, are hard men prone to military solutions. All they need is the right vehicle and that spark of leadership which could catapult them to bloody destruction and pillage of the corrupt establishment.”

The study of war gives a man all that and more. We should always go before our enemies with confidence, otherwise our apparent uneasiness inspires them with greater boldness.

War and its bastard son espionage, decides the future of us all. It is an eternal verity that simultaneously shapes both the past and future. Unlike what the corrupt fanatics whine about peace (peace gives them a chance to rob workers), war is omnipresent and there is no peace.

How many things apparently impossible have nevertheless been performed by resolute men who had no alternative but death.

War (conflict) is eternal, so it behooves us to learn all we can about it. If we do not, we will someday be victimized by those who study war.

The stronger never retreat, they dictate the terms which the weak obey.

Studying war is not so much the becoming an expert with all weapons. A man who is a good pistol and rifle shot as well as being handy with a long knife or axe is enough. Later he can learn the art of the symphony played by that famous quartet composed of: the light machine gun, the RPG, the light mortar and the sniper rifle.
A man is not dependent upon his fellow creatures, when he does not fear death.
The study of war and espionage should focus upon how it works and how to lead it.

The study of war and espionage by common men is necessary so that governments will realize that their populace is capable if fighting a people’s war if they have to.

If you and I understand how to organize and employ Warfighting and espionage methods at the three levels of war (tactical, operational and strategic) then we will be respected more because we will know what is going on.

If we don’t like what’s going on, we will be able to gather intelligence on it and use nonviolent methods to change it.

If we have to, we can organize and lead armies and intelligence agencies, if we study war.

International incidents must not be allowed to shape foreign policy, national foreign policy must shape the incidents.

By the way, the study of war for its own sake is much more interesting than sports because they are more realistic ways to measure success and failure. For example, our enemies can kill our biggest tanks with RPGs that cost about fifty dollars to produce and each round costs a few dollars. The latest “shoulder-fired” American version of the same antitank weapon, the Javelin, costs $200,000+ per-unit and $100,000+ per-shot or round. (The Pentagon is looking at a “cheap” Spike anti-tank weapon that costs a mere $5,000 per unit and $5,000 per round. In the Pentagon’s frame of reference, each weapon should cost at least one tenth of the target it kills. Never mind that such thinking is crazy.)

If you know such facts from studying war, you will be affected and mesmerized by both shocking stupidity and glorious gallantry. Every soldier carries a marshal's baton in his pack.-Napoleon

As a student of war, you will begin to realize several things: (1) America’s generals and politicians are making stupid mistakes. (2) You will then start asking questions. How can they justify wastage? How are they trained? Are they stupid? Crooked, incompetent, or traitorous? (3) In answering those questions you will discover that many of the people in government are perverted, criminal, incompetent and traitorous. That includes America’s top generals and law makers. (4) When faced with the realization of the truth, you will be better able to deal with your responsibilities as a citizen and preserver of freedom for your family and their future. (5) Eventually you may even choose to quit being a serf and stand up for what you believe. (There are many irregularities in public elections, which we could correct if we studied political warfare, for example.)

Remember , gentlemen, what a Roman emperor said: The corpse of an enemy always smells sweet.-Napoleon

If the art of war were nothing but the art of avoiding risks, glory would become the prey of mediocre minds. I have made all the calculations, fate will do the rest.

Most Americans know nothing about the: suitability, orientations, biases or signs of incompetence and betrayal, found among US generals and within intelligence agencies. They depend on media “journalists for that.

There are several reasons why media journalists will always misinform the American public: (1) They are ideologically biased to the left and everything they will report will be slanted according to the group of prejudices all leftists share. (2) They provide information that is shallow and skewed because their sources are frequently anti-American. (3) According to content evaluations of the reports of American journalists on military and espionage affairs, journalists know almost nothing about how either system works or should work. (4) "Journalists" have no frame of reference for evaluating whether any set of behaviors, military or espionage, is beneficial or harmful to, the interests of the taxpayers.

Men soon get tired of shedding their blood for the advantage of a few individuals, who think they amply reward the soldiers' perils with the treasures they amass. --Napoleon

The good news is that American citizens no longer have to depend on journalists, politicians or leftist authors to obtain distorted information. They can obtain sound, frame-of-reference, how-to oriented e-book information for both military and espionage affairs.

When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an adversary of superior talent, for if you are beaten, even in the midst of your magazines and your communications, woe to the vanquished!--Napoleon

A frame of reference is a set of guidelines for evaluating either espionage or military decisions (a useful set of ideas, conditions, or assumptions that determine how something should be approached, perceived, or understood).

Students of war must find books that are based on an identified frame of reference that is useful when examining the decisions of generals and politicians who are paid by public taxes to represent the majority’s best interests.
Governments keep their promises only when they are forced to, or when it is to their advantage to do so
.In order for a person to understand what is going on, enjoy that understanding and participate in exciting scenarios, the study of war and espionage is a much more gratifying and beneficial hobby than sports.

Men who have changed the world never achieved their success by winning the chief citizens to their side, but always by stirring the masses. Do not talk to me of goodness, of abstract justice, of nature law. Necessity is the highest law, public welfare is the highest justice. Take time to deliberate, but when the time for action has arrived, stop thinking and go. Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide.

Note: All Napoleonic Quotes are in red.

Maneuver Redux

Maneuver Redux

Future battles may be conducted in an environment which is unevenly lethal, usually non-linear, and often uncertain. The lethality of many nation’s weapons has not improved dramatically in the past 20 years. High technology is not the prerequisite for victory, in fact it sometimes causes defeat. Expert human warriors organized into maneuver oriented, cohesive shock groups, are the best guarantee of victory. Soldiers who: lose battles, are not allowed to win, are punished for initiative, are not rewarded for heroism, are allowed to be humiliated, and who are distrusted and arrested, will not remain in the armed forces. On the non-linear battlefield some units will be required to employ greater dispersion and increased speed of movement if they are to survive. Forces opposing each other should no longer advance within well-defined linear boundaries. Opportunities for success on the battlefield will appear fleetingly as units maneuver to exploit gaps and gain the initiative. Control of the battlefield will
not be emphasized. Commanders will be forced to make rapid decisions, often in the face of conflicting information and uncertainty.Maneuver Warfare and the Modern BattlefieldThe Philosophy of Maneuver Warfare, oriented towards winning battles, campaigns and wars, exploits the nonlinear environment, and advocates that success will largely depend on our ability to adapt to constantly changing situations. (Adaptation is one measure of intelligence.) Current USMC doctrine (The USMC does not utilize maneuver warfare. No US ground force can use maneuver warfare because the emphasis is upon machine roboticism, micromanagement and diplomacy) defines Maneuver Warfare as "an approach to warfare that emphasizes disrupting the cohesion of the enemy's tactical units and the mental process of the enemy commander - his ability to make correct and timely decisions - rather than simply inflicting casualties at a greater rate than they are sustained."Maneuver Warfare is a way of fighting smart, of out-thinking an opponent that may be resistant to being overpowered only with brute strength. That does not mean that paying tribute/bribes, handing out money and constantly begging for peace, is a substitute for attrition and somehow is related to maneuver.Maneuver Warfare is based on the fact that a battle consists of two forces pitted against each other. The actions of each force causes the other to modify existing plans. The force which can consistently regroup, replan and react first will gain and maintain the initiative.In a successful battle, the enemy is continually forced to modify his plans in reference to his opponent. After each modification, however, it is necessary for the friendly force to conduct further actions so that the enemy's plan repeatedly needs revision. At each repetition, the enemy's response is increasingly inappropriate until, eventually, his organization loses cohesion and he is forced to disengage or face destruction.To force an enemy to alter his plan it is necessary to surprise him, frequently by relentless drives into the enemy entrails. To achieve surprise, that is to do something unexpected, requires some risk. If all risk is minimized, then the chosen course will be apparent and surprise will not be achieved. The acceptance of risk is essential to the attainment of surprise. Having achieved surprise, the commander must now act more quickly than the enemy can react. Given the chaos which will reign on the battlefield, the commander's aim must be not to try to impose order, but rather to organize himself and his battle groups to cope with the disorder quicker than his opponent. A responsive initiative-oriented, expert command system, is necessary. Amateur commands applying analysis in a machine environment will invariably lose in the long run.Maneuver Warfare is not a new concept. While the Germans and Soviets have often been regarded as the premier exponents of the "maneuver" style of war, they have not been alone. Other countries have for many years advocated similar philosophies. For example, a decade ago, Quikmaneuvers’ theorists developed a list of concepts for commanders on the confused battlefield. That creed included the following points:
Ø Continuous reconnaissance and effective intelligence (recon forces equal to 30% of combat forces) recon-pull
Ø Widespread use of advance detachments and desant
Ø Rapid exploitation of crucial intelligence
Ø Activnost, leaders who can think on the move (see Grenadier by Kurt “panzer” Myer) act boldly on contact,
Ø seek surprise
Ø do not delay, do something and do it right away
Ø seek gaps, avoid surfaces, reinforce success
Ø identify a schwerpunt on offense and on defense,
Ø shift the schwerpunkt as necessary
Ø battles can be won even when all troops are not fully briefed if officers are well trained, ideologically motivated and discipline is tight
Ø the unexpected immediate action usually achieves surprise
Ø when the battle hangs in the balance quick decision is more likely to succeed than a deliberate estimate and plan
Ø Generals lead from the front,
Ø staffs are support functions not command authorities
Ø If a general depends on his staff for thinking, the general is eliminated
Ø Ruthlessness and tempo guide the action
Ø Victory, not end states, is the objective
Ø Every soldier must be imbued with the concept of seizing the initiative
Ø Soldiers must be trusted without command use of: micromanagement, ROE commissars, journalistic interference and other detrimental concepts now paralyzing , for example, US armed forces
Ø Victory must be obtained at the operational level
Ø Logistics must be reorganized to fuel the battle
Ø Probe, Pin and maneuver
Ø Infiltration by desant targeted against enemy HQs and logistics nodes
Ø Widespread use of landmines
Ø Preserve the combat lethality of the force by any means necessary.

Of course, some of the above concepts appear controversial and they are unworkable in the US, Canuckistan and Western European armed forces which do not fight to win. They fight for end states.In order to understand maneuver warfare, it must be explained and rehearsed, first with written or paper war games and then actual war games.

Clausewitz's Critik

Clausewitz's Kritik

The Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, in his book, On War, described a concept of critical analysis that he called Kritik, a tool for studying war, which facilitates the development of military theory. Clausewitz, like the modern Soviet Armed Forces, had a clear purpose for his study of war. He was not seeking a set of cookbook formulas for war; instead he was looking for keys to understanding the relationship between phenomenons encountered in war. He realized that understanding of the processes at work would inevitably improve military judgment. Clausewitz characterized Kritik as, "...a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books...It is meant to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield..."Clausewitz correctly postulated that the purpose of studying war was to objectively discover why events "took the turn they did." He warned against the "dogma of responsibility," by arguing that the purpose of study was not to reward or punish the defeated or victorious. He also insisted that in war, "...criticism exists only to recognize the truth... We may legitimately criticize a general's decision..." He was right, generals must be accountable, yet it is no accident that the worst armies have the least number of well known, deserving generals. It is Clausewitz's widom that has guided me in writing quikmaneuver's set of seven different books on Incompetent, Bureaucratic and treasonous generals."Excerpted from: From Red Blitzkreig, Volume 1, by Breaker McCoy, http://www.quikmaneuvers.com

Corruption of US Armed Forces

Corruption of US Armed Forces
The incompetent bureucrats now in charge of American armed forces should be examined in detail. Alas, there are only five or six books extant which actually criticise, in depth, American generals for incompetence and ideological anarchism. The jargon of American armed forces has veered away from the type of rhetoric common to communities of warfighting warriors. It is now the jargon of mediocrity and futility. Battles are fought, not for victory, but for ambiguous and futile "end states."FM 100-5, Operations, defines end state as: "A military end state includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state." The commanders intent defines military conditions that must be achieved to support the end state. In the last comment of the commander's intent, the commander defines victory or success for the operation. Some example END STATES are: For an Infantry Battalion in Tactical Operations as Part of Peace Enforcement Operations, END STATE = "When the belligerent forces change their policy and behavior to conform to the demands of the international political agency sponsoring the operation." For Operation RESTORE HOPE, END STATE = "The end state desired is to create an environment in which the UN and NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia humanitarian relief efforts." Who wants to give their lives for such bull s**t?American soldiers are not warfighters they are peacekeeprs who must sacrifice their pride, dignity, common sense and safety to raging enemies who hate them.A number of guidelines that will apply to the conduct of a peacekeeping force in all situations:All ranks must understand what the peacekeeping force is trying to do. All ranks must be fully briefed on the political and military situation, the customs and religions of the people and kept up to date as the situation changes. They must make every effort to get to know the people, to understand their problems with the aim of achieving a reputation for sympathy and impartiality. Peacekeeping soldiers must maintain a high profile; consequently, their lives are continually at risk. Commanders must balance the need to maintain a confident presence with provisions for the safety of their troops. No detachment, likely to face a difficult situation, should be without a knowledgeable individual in charge because of the crucial decisions which may affect the reputation of the force, the success of the mission, and the safety of the peacekeeping troops. These decisions have to be made without delay. However, emergencies may arise when no officer is available. Units should make sure that NCOs are well trained, briefed and prepared for the contingencies they are likely to face on peacekeeping operations. The policy on rules of engagement and the action to be taken with regard to infringements and violations of agreements must be enforced uniformly by all units. In operations where units have used noticeably different standards in executing the rules, there has been trouble with the belligerents and constant friction between the national contingents. Peacekeepers cannot be too concerned about the risk of appearing to "lose face." On many occasions, explosive situations have been defused because of the peacekeepers willingness to be accommodating, allowing a party to preserve its dignity. This is especially important when dealing with societies in which self-esteem and group honor are of great importance. It is sometimes difficult to explain the need for tact, without compromising principle, to soldiers who are trained to be forceful and aggressive. A unit naturally wishes to take credit for a successful performance, but undue concern for unit pride may prejudice the peacekeepers need to make concessions. Each situation calls for its own blend of calm, mature judgment, tact, a willingness to compromise, firmness and moral courage.American armed forces literature no longer discusses victory in any context. They only discuss "end states." For example, a foreign-born, Marxist, Muslim, African dictator could order predominantly white, Christian, freedom-loving, native American soldiers to sacrifice their lives and/or limbs for a series of controversial "end states" that are only abstractions of pseudo reality and therefore not worthwhile as risks for most American troops.American soldiers are no longer fighting for the victorious preservation of their homes, families and freedom. Now they are fighting for the privilege of "nation building" foreign nations who despise every aspect of their self identication. Discussions of who benefits from wierd and even insane "end states" are disallowed within the US armed forces. Hundreds of US soldiers are being arrested for what is essentially ideological differences disguised as war crimes (thought crimes in the Orwellian sense). For rexample, many troops complain that Muslim prisoners are able to get better medical care than that found in VA hospitals besides numerous stomach churning perks including the right to spit in the face and insult the honor of their guards. Many soldiers also object to the government "end state" of spending billions of taxpayer dollars to fund long and stupid legal cases which will let numerous mass murdering muslims go free.Of course the overwhelming majority of American taxpayers do not understand their armed forces and do not yet realize that the US military no longer protects the best interests of the American people. When the public finally breakthroughs the media lie barrier and gets an accurate fix on the US military, an upheaval will begin. In the meantime they think that supporting the US military is right because the military is supposedly protecting them. They do not understand the self defeating ramifications of Marxist "Laws of war and Rules of Engagement."Soldiers are asking, "Why are we fighting for "end states" that are not beneficial to us?"

Reflexive Control of US Generals

What is a sane man to think when a nation's generals begin to behave so wierdly that their behavior is like that of maladpted morons?
In America, the public does not know the names of its generals nor their individual or group intelligence, bias or ideology.Most Americans believe that generals must be good and should be supported by the populace. Yet they know nothing about the bad decisions, even insane decisions being made by US generals every day.
There is no oversight of US generals, they are not accountable, and no taxpayer has any way of examing their behavior. The politicians don't care. They are too busy whoring, stealing and abusing substances to care. Americans do know that a group of left wing generals became very critical of Secretary of State Rumsfeld and President Bush. Since the media shared the bias of those left wing critics, a sizable minority of Americans followed the lead of the leftist generals, not out of knowledge or understanding but because the media told them what to think.

The fact is that America's conventional generals, that is at least 98% of them, know nothing about winning wars. That is true and can be proved by study of what is available in open sources. ANY check of their behavior in a military battle or operation can be compared to what they should do, and in that comparison, the shocking truth is revealed.

America's generals are not only obviously unfit to lead warriors in combat, they also behave wierdly or bizarrely.The behavior of US generals is so bad that some experts believe that they have been victimized by a Soviet/Russian psychological wafare methodology called Reflexive Control.

I am sure that no body reading this article knows what reflexive control is.

Read the following report.

At the end of July 1997, planners for Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration '97 "focused on technologies that enhance real-time collaborative planning in a multinational task force of the type usedin Bosnia and in Operation Desert Storm. The JWID '97 network, called the Coalition Wide-AreaNetwork (CWAN), is the first military network that allows allied nations to participate as full and equal partners."The demonstration in effect was a trade fair for private companies to demonstrate their goods; defense ministries got to decide where and how to spend their money wiser, in many cases without incurring the cost of prototypes. It is a good example of doing business better with less.Technologies demonstrated included:
Soldiers using laptop computers to drag cross-hairs over maps to call in airstrikesl
Soldiers carrying beepers and mobile phones rather than gunsl
Generals tracking movements of every unit, counting the precise number of shells fired around the globe, and inspecting real-time damage inflicted on an enemy, all with multicolored graphics.

Why would generals want to know what happened when soldiers used laptop computers to drag cross hairs over maps in order to call in airstrikes? How could the soldiers be sure that their cross hairs were placed correctly? If they were correctly placed, what were the generals trying to say?

Why would generals want soldiers to carry beepers and mobile phones instead of guns? Were they saying guns were not necessary for soldiers but the two devices were?

Why did generals plot such wierd things on multicolored graphs? Do the generals think that the inventories on those graphs have anything to do with winning war? For example, it took 6 million tons of bombs during Operation Anaconda to kill 123 Islamic terrorists. Will the general declare after squandering 6 million tons of bombs in specific target areas that 12 more enemy have been blown to bits?

How can the generals get exact real time measurements of damage inflicted on the enemy. At Cassino in WW2, air photos showed that every inch of the targeted battlefield had been ground to dust and no enemy was anywhere visible except for body parts. Yet when a Brit division marched into the area, a few German machine gun teams slaughtered practically the entire division of 15,000 men.

Are American generals saying that they must be as pefect in vision as God in order to win battles? Are the generals thinking straight?

Are graphs of unrelated info the secret to victory? Do generals think that if they have such graphs they will make better decisions>?

Do the generals imply that they have to have every possible shred of info before they can solve a problem? If so how long will that take?

Since 1997, America's generals have conducted hundreds of tests like the one described above. They have actually learned nothing from those tests. However, they agreed that what the US military needed was robots to fight its wars.

Would robots be smarter than America's bureaucrat generals? Yes.

Would robots be smarter than Russian, Chinese or Indian generals? No!

Figure it out. Then send in your evidence.